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ABSTRACT
Efﬁcient, Scalable, and Accurate Program Fingerprinting in Binary
Code
Saed Alrabaee, Ph. D.
Concordia University, 2018
Why was this binary written? Which compiler was used? Which free software
packages did the developer use? Which sections of the code were borrowed? Who wrote
the binary? These questions are of paramount importance to security analysts and reverse
engineers, and binary ﬁngerprinting approaches may provide valuable insights that can
help answer them. This thesis advances the state of the art by addressing some of the
most fundamental problems in program ﬁngerprinting for binary code, notably, reusable
binary code discovery, ﬁngerprinting free open source software packages, and authorship
attribution. First, to tackle the problem of discovering reusable binary code, we employ
a technique for identifying reused functions by matching traces of a novel representation
of binary code known as the semantic integrated graph. This graph enhances the con-
trol ﬂow graph, the register ﬂow graph, and the function call graph, key concepts from
classical program analysis, and merges them with other structural information to create a
joint data structure. Second, we approach the problem of ﬁngerprinting free open source
iii
software (FOSS) packages by proposing a novel resilient and efﬁcient system that in-
corporates three components. The ﬁrst extracts the syntactical features of functions by
considering opcode frequencies and performing a hidden Markov model statistical test.
The second applies a neighborhood hash graph kernel to random walks derived from con-
trol ﬂow graphs, with the goal of extracting the semantics of the functions. The third
applies the z-score to normalized instructions to extract the behavior of the instructions in
a function. Then, the components are integrated using a Bayesian network model which
synthesizes the results to determine the FOSS function, making it possible to detect user-
related functions.
With these elements now in place, we present a framework capable of decoupling bi-
nary program functionality from the coding habits of authors. To capture coding habits,
the framework leverages a set of features that are based on collections of functionality-
independent choices made by authors during coding. Finally, it is well known that tech-
niques such as refactoring and code transformations can signiﬁcantly alter the structure
of code, even for simple programs. Applying such techniques or changing the compiler
and compilation settings can signiﬁcantly affect the accuracy of available binary analysis
tools, which severely limits their practicability, especially when applied to malware. To
address these issues, we design a technique that extracts the semantics of binary code
in terms of both data and control ﬂow. The proposed technique allows more robust bi-
nary analysis because the extracted semantics of the binary code is generally immune
from code transformation, refactoring, and varying the compilers or compilation settings.
iv
Speciﬁcally, it employs data-ﬂow analysis to extract the semantic ﬂow of the registers
as well as the semantic components of the control ﬂow graph, which are then synthe-
sized into a novel representation called the semantic ﬂow graph (SFG). We evaluate the
framework on large-scale datasets extracted from selected open source C++ projects on
GitHub, Google Code Jam events, Planet Source Code contests, and students’ program-
ming projects and found that it outperforms existing methods in several respects. First, it
is able to detect the reused functions. Second, it can identify FOSS packages in real-world
projects and reused binary functions with high precision. Third, it decouples authorship
from functionality so that it can be applied to real malware binaries to automatically gener-
ate evidence of similar coding habits. Fourth, compared to existing research contributions,
it successfully attributes a larger number of authors with a signiﬁcantly higher accuracy.
Finally, the new framework is more robust than previous methods in the sense that there
is no signiﬁcant drop in accuracy when the code is subjected to refactoring techniques,
code transformation methods, and different compilers.
v
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Binary (i.e., executable) code ﬁngerprinting is essential to many security applications;
examples include malware detection, software infringement, vulnerability analysis, and
digital forensics. Furthermore, it is useful for security researchers and reverse engineers
since it offers very important insights of the binary code, such as revealing the function-
ality, authorship attribution, libraries used, and vulnerabilities. To this end, numerous
studies focus on analyzing binary code with the goal of extracting ﬁngerprints that can
illuminate the semantics of a target application. However, extracting ﬁngerprints is a
challenging task since a substantial amount of important information will be lost during
compilation, notably, variable and function naming, the original control and data ﬂow
structures, comments, semantic information, and the layout. This thesis advances the
state of the art by addressing some of the most fundamental problems in program ﬁnger-
printing for binary code, notably, reusable binary code discovery, ﬁngerprinting free open
1
source software packages, and authorship attribution.
1.1 Motivations
Reused Function Identiﬁcation. The objective of reverse engineering often involves un-
derstanding both the control and data-ﬂow structures of the functions in the given binary
code. However, this is usually a challenging task, as binary code inherently lacks structure
due to the use of jumps and symbolic addresses, highly optimized control ﬂow, varying
registers and memory locations based on the processor and compiler, and the possibility
of interruptions [36]. To assist reverse engineers in such a difﬁcult task, automated tools
for efﬁciently recognizing reused functions for binary code are highly desirable. This is
especially true in the context of malware analysis, since modern malware are known to
contain a signiﬁcant amount of reused code derived from previous existing code [38,117].
Free Open Source Packages Identiﬁcation. When analyzing malware binaries, reverse
engineers often pay special attention to reused free open source packages for several rea-
sons. First, recent reports from anti-malware companies indicate that ﬁnding the simi-
larity between malware codes attributable to reused third-party libraries can aid in devel-
oping proﬁles for malware families [85]. For instance, Flame [39] and other malware
in its family [39] all contain code packages that are publicly available, including SQLite
and LUA [85]. Second, a signiﬁcant proportion of most modern malware consists of
third-party libraries; as such, identifying reused libraries is a critical preliminary step in
the process of extracting information about the functionality of a malware binary. Third,
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in more challenging cases where obfuscation techniques may have been applied and the
reused third-party libraries may differ from their original source ﬁles, it is still desir-
able to determine which part of the malware binary is borrowed from which third-party
libraries. Fourth, in addition to identifying third-party libraries, clustering third-party li-
braries based on their common origin may help reverse engineers to identify new malware
from a known family or to decompose a malware binary based on the origin of its func-
tions. Fifth, third-party libraries should be ﬁltered out when the authorship attribution
tools are applied.
Binary Authorship Identiﬁcation. Existing approaches to binary authorship attribu-
tion typically employ machine learning methods to extract unique features for each au-
thor and subsequently match a given binary against such features to identify the au-
thor [27, 44, 112]. We have studied and analyzed these approaches in previous research
[28]. We have found that these approaches also share a critical limitation: they cannot
distinguish between features related to author style (e.g., coding habits) and features re-
lated to functionality. Consequently, the extracted features, though unique for each author,
may be completely unrelated to programming style. In addition, other limitations, such
as a signiﬁcantly lower accuracy in the case of multiple authors, being easily defeated
by refactoring techniques or simple obfuscation methods, and not being validated against
real malware, are also shared by these existing efforts. More recently, the feasibility of
authorship attribution on malware binaries was discussed at the BlackHat conference [91].
A set of features are employed to group malware binaries according to authorship [91].
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However, the process is not automated and requires considerable human intervention. We
present a component that is designed to recognize authors’ coding habits by decoupling
them from program functionality in binary code. Instead of using generic features (e.g.,
n-gram or small subgraphs of a CFG [112]), which may or may not be related to author-
ship, BinAuthor captures coding habits based on a collection of functionality-independent
choices frequently made by authors during coding (e.g., preferring to use either if or
switch, and relying more on either object-oriented modularization or procedural pro-
gramming).
1.2 Research objectives and contributions
The main goals of our research are summarized in the following points:
• Authorship Analysis. Malware analysts are typically interested to discover clues
that lead to the parties that are responsible. Such clues should be able to discrim-
inate code written by different developers, which also might be used to discover
stylistic similarities between binary programs.
• Function Fingerprinting. Fingerprints are useful in automating reverse engineer-
ing tasks including clone detection, library identiﬁcation, authorship attribution,
cyber forensics, etc. In this thesis, a set of tools are designed for ﬁngerprinting bi-
nary functions. The main objective is to provide an accurate and scalable solution
to ﬁngerprint (i) reused binary functions; and (ii) reused free open source packages.
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Speciﬁcally, this thesis makes the following contributions:
1.2.1 SIGMA: Reused Function Identiﬁcation [29]
This component is based on a technique for identifying reused functions in binary code by
matching traces of a novel representation of binary code, namely, the Semantic Integrated
Graph (SIG). The SIG enhances and merges several existing concepts from classic pro-
gram analysis, including control ﬂow graph, register ﬂow graph, and function call graph
into a joint data structure. Such a comprehensive representation allows us to capture dif-
ferent semantic descriptors of common functionalities in a uniﬁed manner as graph traces,
which can be extracted from binaries and matched to identify reused functions, actions,
or open source software packages. In summary, our contributions to the problem of iden-
tifying reused functions in binary code are as follows:
• We introduce the novel SIG representation of binary code to unify various semantic
information, such as control ﬂow, register manipulation, and function call into a
joint data structure to facilitate more efﬁcient graph matching.
• We deﬁne different types of traces such as normal traces, AND-traces, and OR-
traces over SIG graphs, which are used for inexact matching. We carry out both
exact and inexact matching between different binaries, where an exact matching
applies to two SIG graphs with the same graph properties (e.g. number of nodes),
whereas an inexact matching employs graph edit distance to measure the degree of
similarity between two SIG graphs of different sizes.
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1.2.2 FOSSIL: Free Open Source Packages Identiﬁcation [30]
This component is based on a novel resilient and efﬁcient system that incorporates three
layers. The ﬁrst layer extracts the syntactical features of functions by considering opcode
frequencies and applying a hidden Markov model statistical test. The second layer applies
a neighborhood hash graph kernel to random walks derived from control ﬂow graphs, with
the goal of extracting the semantics of the functions. The third layer applies z-score to the
normalized instructions to extract the behavior of instructions in a function. The layers
are integrated using a Bayesian network model which synthesizes the results to determine
the FOSS function. The novel approach of combining these layers using the Bayesian
network has produced stronger resilience to code obfuscation. In short, it makes the
following contributions:
• FOSSIL is the ﬁrst system developed to identify reused FOSS packages in malware
binaries that supports multiple feature (syntactic, semantic, and structural features).
Its novelty also lies in its ability to integrate the ranked opcodes, subgraph search,
and function behavior. This helps reverse engineers to recognize the types of appli-
cations that a malware binary incorporates in order to characterize the malware.
• We propose an adaptive hidden Markov and Bayesian model capable of approxi-
mating the similarity between functions. This adaptive model boosts the matching
search quality and yields stable results across different datasets and metrics.
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1.2.3 BinAuthor: Binary Authorship Attribution
This component is based on a collection of functionality-independent choices frequently
made by authors during coding (e.g., preferring to use either if or switch, and relying
more on either object-oriented modularization or procedural programming). Our main
contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this component is the ﬁrst system capable of de-
coupling author coding habits from program functionality in binary code. The
novel approach of using functionality-independent features allows our system to
overcome a key limitation of most existing works: assuming the existence of spe-
cial training data (binaries with identical functionality but written by different au-
thors [27, 44, 112]). By avoiding such an unrealistic assumption, our system paves
the way towards practical applications of automated binary authorship attribution.
• The proposed system yields high accuracy that survives refactoring and source/bi-
nary obfuscation techniques. This shows the potential of our system as a practi-
cal tool to assist reverse engineers in a number of security-related tasks, such as
identifying the author of a malware sample, clustering malware samples based on
common authors, and determining the number of authors (e.g., a large number of
authors may indicate an organizational effort).
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1.2.4 BinGold: Extracting the Semantics of Binary Code [31]
This component is based on extracting various types of semantics and integrating them
into a novel representation called a Semantic Flow Graph (SFG). This component makes
following contributions:
• We introduce the novel SFG representation of binary code to unify various seman-
tic information, such as control ﬂow, register manipulation, data ﬂow analysis, and
function call into a joint data structure to facilitate more efﬁcient graph matching.
• We deﬁne different types of traces over SFG graphs to serve as matching fea-
tures and then carry out both exact and inexact matching between different bina-
ries, where an exact matching applies to two SFG graphs with the same number of
nodes, and an inexact matching employs graph edit distance to measure the degree
of similarity between two SFG graphs of different size.
• We test our method on a large test suite across different operating systems, compil-
ers, and compiling optimizations. Our results show that our method achieves higher
accuracy than previously available ﬁngerprint representations.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we present the back-
ground literature about binary analysis and review the state-of-the-art techniques that are
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close to the proposed framework. In Chapter 3, we introduce our system for identifying
reuse functions in binary code. Chapter 4 provides our designed system for ﬁngerprint-
ing free open source code. In Chapter 5, we introduce the binary authorship attribution.
In Chapter 6, we detail the contribution of our framework in extracting the semantics of




Background and Related Work
This thesis investigates different aspects of binary code, the most important question of
which is how to extract particular aspects from a binary code. This question is central to
many works on binary code analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the efforts
that are most closely related to the applications of our framework. In this chapter, we
review studies that extract semantics characteristics from binary programs. Speciﬁcally,
this chapter ﬁrst presents an overview of the importance of binary analysis. Then, it
highlights the challenges might be received. After that, it reviews three areas of related
work. First, it introduces the existing efforts in reused code identiﬁcation. Subsequently,
it highlights the existing efforts that are related to ﬁngerprinting free open source software
packages. Finally, we highlight the existing techniques for authorship attribution.
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2.1 Importance of Binary Analysis
Binary code analysis is an important process in many security applications such as mal-
ware analysis [37, 57, 95, 128], software reliability [89], reverse engineering [42, 61], de-
bugging [33], digital forensics [27], and security analysis [62, 73, 103].
2.1.1 Reverse Engineering
Binary code analysis is considered as the crucial process for the reverse engineers in sev-
eral tasks: (i) Authorship attribution that refers to the process of identifying the author
of an anonymous binary ﬁle based on stylistic characteristics. Its aim is to automate the
laborious and error-prone reverse engineering task of discovering information related to
the author(s) of binary code [28]. (ii) Reused code discovery is the process of determin-
ing the reused free open-source software packages [102, 115]. (iii) Compiler provenance
identiﬁcation encompasses numerous pieces of information, such as the compiler family,
compiler version, optimization level, and compiler-related functions [108, 114]. (iv) Pro-
gram binaries normally contain a signiﬁcant amount of third-party library functions taken
from standard libraries and the process of determining such functions is called library
functions identiﬁcation.
2.1.2 Malware Analysis
Binary analysis is important for malware analysis because when malware attacks a com-
puter system or network, it leaves an executable behind but rarely the source code. A
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comprehensive understanding of binary analysis is particularly vital in the ongoing war-
fare between malware writers and anti-malware vendors. Each camp performs different
operations on the binary code according to their goals as described below.
• Binary modiﬁcation enables a malware writer to alter existing code or to inject new
code into programs to execute malicious behavior without requiring the source code
or debugging information [93, 118].
• Binary comparison automatically classiﬁes new malware samples based on the as-
sumption that unknown malware is often produced from known malware [35].
• Binary obfuscation is used by malware writers to obfuscate malicious code to avoid
existing detection techniques, such as misuse detection algorithms. This operation
relies on the fact that the detection techniques are based on sensitivity to slight
modiﬁcations in the program syntax [130].
• Virus signatures are used to identify speciﬁc code patterns, called signatures, within
a program. When a signature is found, the program most likely contains a virus.
For instance, scanning for the following hexadecimal sequence can identify the
Chernobyl virus [124]:
E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050
0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA 8B2B
In response, malware writers may attempt to complicate the binary code to thwart
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anti-virus techniques. Although the signature identiﬁcation method is highly ef-
fective in identifying known malware, it cannot identify new or unknown mal-
ware [70].
The evasion techniques are summarized below.
• Compression techniques compress the executable binary ﬁle and include a decom-
pression algorithm in the code, which enables the compressed program to run [118].
• Polymorphism is a technique that produces different packed binary ﬁle versions
from the same source input [121].
• Code obfuscation alters malicious code to help it avoid detection. Obfuscation can
thwart most existing detection techniques [130].
• Packing is a method used by malware writers to hide their software from signature-
based investigation techniques. While packing techniques vary substantially, their
objectives are identical: to modify the appearance of the program code while en-
suring that the semantics remain the same. A common approach is to use binaries
created directly in assembly language rather than compiled from a high-level lan-
guage to avoid any evidence of the author’s intentions [80].
2.1.3 Digital Forensics
FireEye [97] discovered that malware binaries share very important information that re-
veal the digital infrastructures used, code traits, and other semantic information, such as
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timestamp, the use of certiﬁcates, executable resources and development tools. FireEye
investigators eventually noticed that malware binaries of the same, previously discovered,
infrastructures are written by the same group of authors. In such cases, training on such
binaries and some random authors’ code may offer a vital help to forensics investigators.
In addition, testing a recent piece of malware binary code using some conﬁdence metrics
would verify if a speciﬁc author is the actual author.
2.1.4 Software Infringement
It is very important to analyze the binary code in order to discover that a piece of code
is not written by the claimed author. Generally, the adversary attempts to modify code
written by another author to match his/her own style [43, 44]. In forensics applications,
two of the parties may collaborate to modify the style of code written by one to match the
other’s style [43,44]. This emphasizes the importance of binary analysis to discover clues
that help in tackle such scenarios. Also, building an online repository of candidate au-
thors based on previously collected malware samples, would greatly help in infringement
analysis [43].
2.2 Binary Analysis Challenges
Binary code analysis poses a considerably greater challenge than source code analy-
sis [93]. These challenges are summarized as follows:
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C1 Compiler’s effects. Compilers may have inserted substantial changes in the bi-
nary code such as compiler tags [114]. These changes tend to hinder the abilities
of binary analysis approaches, causing inaccurate reported results produces by ap-
proaches. Such coding changes inﬂuence the analytical aptitude for understanding
the processes and objectives of a program and hinder the approach’s ability to ap-
propriately analyze the binary program.
C2 Lack of semantics. In essence, binary code lacks the larger amount of seman-
tic information available in source code. Such information may be related to the
code structure, the buffer characteristics, and the function prototypes that are to be
executed at the binary stage, complicating the binary analysis.
C3 Function boundary identiﬁcation. Most of existing efforts disassemble the bi-
nary ﬁle into assembly ﬁle for gaining more information. This is considered as the
ﬁrst step in binary analysis. Assembly ﬁle encompasses a set of functions. Such
functions should be recognized by deﬁning the starting and ending address of each
function [32]. However, many existing tools cannot recognize a function’s start-
ing point [116]; therefore, they are unable to access the actual code. Therefore, the
many binary analysis techniques which rely on function boundary information must
ﬁrst attempt to recover it through function identiﬁcation.
C4 Binary format. For an x86 computer processor, the familiar formats currently
include the Executable and Linking Format (ELF) and the Portable Executable (PE)
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format employed in Linux and Windows, respectively. These two formats divide a
ﬁle into segments (i.e., data and control) that can be allocated to store and/or code
data. The segments can be identiﬁed as writable, readable, and/or executable at
runtime. However, no guidelines exist regarding the allotment of data and code.
For instance, code sections frequently incorporate data such as string constants or
jump tables. Identifying all compiled binary segments as writable, readable, or
executable may not be possible.
C5 Code Sections discovery. Binary code encompasses two main sections: code and
data sections. The segregation process between these sections is very important
since binary analysis approaches may misinterpret critical data bytes as instruc-
tions or miss real instructions [93]. Also, modifying the critical data will cause
crashing the program. Moreover, the binary ﬁngerprinting approaches require the
data sections ro be recognized carefully in order to extract a set of efﬁcient features
for their purposes.
C6 Debug information availability. When debugging information is stripped from
the binary code, much of the valuable information will be lost in stripping process.
These information include the strings, variable information, and the standard library
functions linked into the binary code [74]. This hinders the binary ﬁngerprinting
approaches.
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2.3 Binary Code Transformation
This section describes a set of binary code transformation methods that most existing
works, especially for ﬁngerprinting applications (e.g., authorship), could be affected by
them. These methods include certain binary disturbances such as compiler optimizations,
differences in build environments, refactoring process, etc. In what follows, we describe
examples of such disturbances.
2.3.1 Function Inlining
In practice, the compiler may inline a small function into its caller code as an optimization.
This may introduce additional complexity to the code. Furthermore, function-inlining
signiﬁcantly changes the CFG of a program, which may become problematic for existing
binary analysis approaches [106]. Finding inlined code is a challenging task [107]. The
accuracy will undoubtedly drop if the features are derived from a function that includes
inlined functions or if the target programs do not show such inlining. Still, using the
multiple initial basic block matches will not likely ﬁnd the multiple counterparts in the
non-inlined target program [106].
2.3.2 Instruction Reordering
Compilers may reorder independent computations to enhance data locality. Reordered
instructions in a basic block change the syntactic representation [106]. However, the
semantics of a basic block remain the same.
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2.3.3 Refactoring Process
Refactoring process might alter the structure of code without changing the way it be-
haves [67]. Refactoring is considered a best practice when creating and maintaining
software; indeed, research suggests that programmers practice it regularly [99, 125]. Ex-
amples of refactoring include renaming a variable, moving a method from a superclass
to its subclasses, and taking a few statements and extracting them into a new method.
These examples are referred to as RENAME, PUSH DOWN METHOD, and EXTRACT
METHOD [67].
2.4 Reused Function Identiﬁcation
There are several frameworks proposed for extracting the semantics of binary code for
particular tasks, such as BinSlayer [41], BinJuice [86], BitShred [75], and iBinHunt [96].
Such frameworks may use for identifying reused functions. BinSlayer uses a polynomial
algorithm to ﬁnd the similarity between executables, obtained by fusing the well-known
BinDiff algorithm [66] with the Hungarian algorithm [98] for bi-partite graph match-
ing. BinJuice extracts the abstraction of the semantics of binary blocks which is termed
"juice". Whereas the denotational semantics summarizes the computation performed by
a block, its juice presents a template of the relationships established by the block [86].
BitShred is a framework for automatic code reuse detection in binary code [75]. BitShred
can be used for identifying the amount of shared code based on the ability to calculate
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the similarities among binary code. iBinhunt is a technique to ﬁnd the semantic differ-
ences between two binary programs when the source code is not available. It uses the
process of analyzing control ﬂow, particularly intra-procedural control ﬂow [96]. More
recently, ESH a new tool has been proposed [52]. They introduce a statistical approach
for measuring the similarity between two fragments (e.g., procedures). Genius [64] em-
ploys different set of features, generates codebooks from CFGs, translates the codebooks
into numeric vectors, and ﬁnally using locality sensitive hashing (LSH) to overcome the
scalability.
2.5 Fingerprinting Free Open Source Function
In this section, we review relevant research works on binary function ﬁngerprinting.
2.5.1 Search-Based Function Fingerprinting
Creating a search engine for executables is an extremely important issue, as it helps re-
verse engineers to detect the functionality of the code. To the best of our knowledge, there
are three search engines for binaries: "Rendezvous" [81], "Tracelet" [53], and "SAR-
VAM" [101]. The SARVAM search engine is designed for malware binaries. Given a
malware query, a ﬁngerprint is ﬁrst computed based on transformed image features [101].
Tracelet introduces an engine for searching binary functions in the code base. The au-
thors decompose CFGs into ﬁxed length subtraces excluding jump instructions, which
are called tracelets. Rendezvous [81] identiﬁes binary code using a statistical model
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comprising instruction mnemonics, control ﬂow sub-graphs, and data constant features.
BinClone [63] is a binary clone system that shows the feasibility of detecting exact clones
in assembly code based on n-grams. However, it suffers from signature collisions and
is not scalable. Most recently, BinGo [47] a cross-architecture binary code search is
proposed. This system consists of two components: The ﬁrst is designed to ﬁlter out
OS functions and the second is to model binary function by extracting variant traces. A
very recent approach namely BinSequence [72] has been proposed. They compare two
functions by extracting the longest common sequence path and applying neighborhood
exploration.
2.5.2 Dynamic Function Fingerprinting Methods
Dynamic ﬁngerprinting methods are a set of ways to analyze a program to determine
the speciﬁc inputs which cause each part of a program to execute. The work introduced
by Homan et al. [76], the authors compared execution traces using longest common se-
quences. A new method to automatically ﬁnd vulnerabilities and generate exploits has
been proposed [34]. These authors propose preconditioned symbolic execution, a new
technique for targeting symbolic execution. A new method is proposed for mutating well-
formed program inputs or simply fuzzing, which is a highly effective and widely used
strategy to ﬁnd bugs in software [110]. Moreover, a binary search engine called Blanket
Execution (BLEX) [58], executes functions and collects the side effects of functions; two
functions with similar side effects are claimed to be similar.
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2.6 Authorship Attribution
In this section, we review the related work to our main component that is designed for
binary authorship attribution.
2.6.1 Source Code Authorship
Most previous studies of authorship analysis for general-purpose software have focused
on source code [43,83,119]. These techniques are typically based on programming styles
(e.g., naming variables and functions, comments, and code organization) and the develop-
ment environment (e.g., OS, programming language, compiler, and text editor). The fea-
tures selected by these techniques are highly dependent on the availability of the source
code, which is seldom available when dealing with malware binaries. When dealing with
executable ﬁles, it is infeasible to use most of these features as they are lost after the com-
pilation and linking process. Spafford and Weeber [119] suggest that the use of lexical
features (e.g., variable names) and syntactic features (e.g., usage of keywords) could aid in
source code authorship attribution. Krsul and Spafford [83] attempt to ﬁnd characteristics
that represent coding style, suggesting that identifying programming style should be pos-
sible within a closed environment. More recently, Caliskan-Islam et al. [43] investigate
methods to deanonymize source code authors of C++ using coding style.
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2.6.2 Binary Code Authorship
In contrast to source code, binary code has drawn signiﬁcantly less attention with respect
to authorship attribution. This is mainly due to the fact that many salient features that
may identify an author’s style are lost during the compilation process. In [27, 44, 112],
the authors show that certain stylistic features can indeed survive the compilation pro-
cess and remain intact in binary code, thus showing that authorship attribution for binary
code should be feasible. The methodology developed by Rosenblum et al. [112] is the
ﬁrst attempt to automatically identify authors of software binaries. The main concept
employed by this method is to extract syntax-based features using predeﬁned templates
such as idioms (sequences of three consecutive instructions), n-grams, and graphlets. A
subsequent approach to automatically identify the authorship of software binaries is pro-
posed by Alrabaee et al. [27]. The main concept employed by this method is to extract a
sequence of instructions with speciﬁc semantics and to construct a graph based on register
manipulation. A more recent approach to automatically identify the authorship of soft-
ware binaries is proposed by Caliskan-Islam et al. [44]. The authors extract syntactical
features present in source code from decompiled executable binaries. Although these ap-
proaches represent solid progress on authorship attribution, not one of these approaches
is applied to real malware, mostly due to their dependency on training data with the same
functionality (which is infeasible in the case of malware). In [94], the authors introduce
new ﬁne-grained techniques to address the problem of identifying the multiple authors of
binary code by determining the author of each basic block. They extract syntactic and
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semantic features at a basic level, such as constant values in instructions, backward slices
of variables, and width and depth of a function control ﬂow graph (CFG). Furthermore,
these approaches suffer from certain limitations, including low accuracy in the case of
multiple authors and being potentially thwarted by simple obfuscation.
Moreover, most existing work on malware authorship attribution relies on manual
analysis. In 2013, a technical report published by FireEye [97] discovered that malware
binaries share the same digital infrastructure and code; for instance, the use of certiﬁcates,
executable resources, and development tools. More recently, the team at Citizen Lab [11]
attributed malware authors according to the manual analysis exploit type found in binaries
and the manner by which actions are performed, such as connecting to a command and
control server. The authors in [91] presented a novel approach to creating credible links
between binaries originating from the same group of authors [91]. Their goal was to add
transparency in attribution and to supply analysts with a tool that emphasizes or denies
vendor statements. The technique is based on features derived from different domains,
such as implementation details, applied evasion techniques, classical malware traits, or
infrastructure attributes, which are leveraged to compare the handwriting among binaries.
We compare the existing authorship in terms of extracted features, implantation
setup, and code availability, as shown in Table 2.1.
The extracted features include syntactic, structural, and semantic features. Most
of the approaches are compatible with Linux binaries (e.g., ELF), and the binaries that
they handle were originally compiled from C/C++ source code. Each approach requires a
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[27]    C++ Windows  Private
[44]    C Windows/Linux  GitHub
[112]    C++ Linux  Public
[94]    C++ Linux Private
training dataset, with the exception of Meng’s approach [94]. When the tools are available
for researchers, we use private repositories, public repositories (indicates that the code is
available but not included in general repositories), and general repositories (e.g., GitHub).
Additionally, we categorize the existing approaches in Figure 2.1.
Meng et al 2017
Binary Authorship
Multiple Authors Single Author
Basic Block ProgramInstruction Function
Alrabaee et al 2014Rosenblum et al 2011 Caliskan et al 2015
Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of authorship approaches
The features are extracted from different levels; for instance, Meng extracts fea-
tures at the basic block level [94]. The machine learning algorithms employed also vary;
for example, Rosenblum et al. used a support vector machine (SVM) algorithm [112],
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whereas Caliskan et al. used a random forest classiﬁcation algorithm [44].
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed different ﬁelds for the purpose of analyzing binary code.
We initially investigated different aspects to highlight the importance of binary code anal-
ysis. Then, we explored certain challenges posed by the binary code analysis process.
Such challenges should be considered by security researchers at any time they intend to
design a tool for binary code analysis. Also, to tackle the drawbacks of aforementioned
existing works, we design a framework that performs four tasks: identifying the compiler-
related functions (this component is named BinComp), determining the reused functions
(SIGMA), ﬁngerprinting free open source software packages third-party libraries (FOS-
SIL), and ﬁnally attributing the author of program binaries (BinAuthor). Following chap-
ters describe each component in details.
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Chapter 3
Towards Identifying Reused Functions
in Binary Code
3.1 Overview
The capability of efﬁciently recognizing reused functions for binary code is critical to
many digital forensics tasks, especially considering the fact that many modern malware
typically contain a signiﬁcant amount of functions borrowed from open source software
packages. Such a capability will not only improve the efﬁciency of reverse engineer-
ing, but also reduce the odds of common libraries leading to false correlations between
unrelated code bases.
In this chapter, we propose SIGMA, a technique for identifying reused functions in
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binary code by matching traces of a novel representation of binary code, namely, the se-
mantic integrated graph (SIG). The SIGs enhance and merge several existing concepts
from classic program analysis, including control ﬂow graph, register ﬂow graph, function
call graph, and other structural information, into a joint data structure. Such a com-
prehensive representation allows us to capture different semantic descriptors of common
functionalities in a uniﬁed manner as graph traces, which can be extracted from binaries
and matched to identify reused functions, actions, or open source software packages.
3.2 Existing Representations of Binary Code
Numerous representations of binary code have been developed for different purposes of
program analysis, such as data ﬂow analysis, control ﬂow analysis, call graph analysis,
structural ﬂow analysis, register manipulation analysis, and program dependency analy-
sis. While these representations have been designed primarily for analyzing binary code,
they can certainly be employed to characterize the code. In particular, we focus on three
representations that capture structural information, namely, control ﬂow graph, register
ﬂow graph, and function call graph. These representations form the basis of our approach
to identifying reused functions in binary code. For the sake of clarity, we introduce a run-
ning example to illustrate these representations using the following sample code (bubble
sort).
Listing 3.1: Bubble Sort C++ Program
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void bubble_sort(int arr[], int size) {






for (int i = 0; i < size - j; i++){
if (arr[i] > arr[i + 1]) {
tmp = arr[i];
arr[i] = arr[i + 1];




}//end of for loop
}//end of while loop
}//end of bubble_sort
3.2.1 Control Flow Graph
Control ﬂow graphs (CFGs) have been used for a variety of applications, e.g., to detect
variants of known malicious applications [46]. A CFG describes the order in which basic
block statements are executed as well as the conditions that need to be met for a partic-
ular path of execution. To this end, basic blocks are represented by nodes connected by
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Figure 3.1: Classical representations for bubble sort function: (a) Control Flow Graph for
bubble sort (b) Register Flow Graph for bubble sort function (c) Function Call Graph for
bubble sort function
directed edges to indicate the transfer of control. It is necessary to assign a label true
(t), false (f), or  to each edge. In particular, a normal node has one outgoing edge
labeled , whereas a predicate node has two outgoing edges corresponding to a true or
false evaluation of the predicate. As an example, the CFG for bubble sort is shown in Fig-
ure 3.1(a). In our context, CFG is a standard code representation in reverse engineering to
aid in understanding. However, while CFGs expose the control ﬂow of a given code, they
fail to provide other useful information, such as the way registers are manipulated by the
code and the interaction between different functions.
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3.2.2 Register Flow Graph
A register ﬂow graph (RFG) is used to capture how registers are manipulated by binary
code, which is originally designed for authorship identiﬁcation of binary code [27]. RFGs
describe the ﬂow and dependencies between registers as an important semantic aspect of
the behavior of a program. We brieﬂy review the concept through an example shown in
Figure 3.1(b). In the RFG, two costs are assigned to edges; β represents the basic block to
which the compare instruction belongs (basic block id), and σ is the cost that is assigned
based on the ﬂow of the register’s values (instruction counts). Regardless of the number
or complexity degree, of functions, the following registers are often accessed: ebp, esp,
esi, edx, eax, and ecx. Therefore, the steps involved in constructing a RFG for these
registers are as follows:
• Counting the number of compare instructions,
• Checking the registers for each compare instruction,
• Checking the ﬂow of each register from the beginning until the compare is reached,
• Classifying the register changes according to the 16 proposed classes in [27].
In RFGs, assembly instructions are classiﬁed into four families: stack, arithmetic,
logical operation, and generic operation, as detailed in the following.
• Arithmetic: this class contains the following; add, sub, mul, div, imul, idiv,
etc.
• Logical: this class contains the following; or, and, xor, test, shl.
• Generic: this class contains the following; mov, lea, call, jmp, jle, etc.
• Stack: this class contains push and pop.
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3.2.3 Function Call Graph
A function call graph (FCG) is the representation of a function in binary code as a directed
graph with labeled vertices, where the vertices correspond to functions and the edges to
function calls. Two labels, I and E are assigned to the nodes; I represents internal library
functions and E represents external library functions. An example of FCG for the bubble
function is shown in Figure 3.1(c). In the literature, external call graphs have been used
for malware detection [60]. In such a case, model graphs and data graphs are compared
in order to distinguish call graphs representing benign programs from those based on
malware samples [60, 111].
3.3 SIGMA Approach
In this section, we ﬁrst provide an overview of the proposed SIGMA approach in Sec-
tion 3.3.1. We then describe the three building blocks of an SIG in Section 3.3.2. We
introduce the SIG concept in Section 3.3.3. Finally, we describe methods for SIG graph
matching in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Overview
The overall architecture of our SIGMA approach is depicted in Figure 3.2. There are two


























































Figure 3.2: SIGMA architecture
The training phase consists of four steps; (i) disassembling the executable and man-
ually ﬁltering out functions related to the compiler; (ii) constructing the following graphs
from user functions: CFG, RFG, and FCG; (iii) applying structural information to CFG
to obtain the structural control ﬂow graph iCFG; applying new merged classes to RFG
to obtain a merged register ﬂow graph mRFG; applying colored classes to FCG to obtain
a colored function call graph cFCG (those concepts will be explained in Section 3.3.2).
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(iv) Merging the previous graphs into a single SIG. We then decompose the SIG into a
set of traces aiming to identify fragments in the functions. Moreover, we consider vari-
ous properties of the SIG, such as the total number of nodes, node types (data, control,
dependence, or structural), edge types, total number of edges, the depth of the graph, etc.
We save these details into a database with the function ID. On the other hand, given a
set of unknown assembly instructions, the testing phase construct the SIG and extract
the properties of the constructed graph and compare it with the existing SIGs graphs in
the database. Hence, we have two methods for matching graphs: (i) exact matching: two
graphs are said to match exactly if they have the same properties. Furthermore, a speciﬁc
fragment gi is said to belong to a speciﬁc function fi if and only if fi has a fragment with
the same properties as gi. (ii) Inexact matching: it is based on edit distance calculation
and the result is compared to predeﬁned threshold value α. Two functions are said to
be the same if their similarity score is less than α. More formally, we have following
deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1. Let f1, f2 be two functions, we say f1 is the copy (or origin) of f2, if
SIG(f1) matches SIG(f2).
Deﬁnition 2. Let f1, f2 be two functions, and SIG(f1)−→ a and let SIG(f2)−→ b
denote extracting SIG traces a and b from f1 and f2. Let sim(a,b) be a similarity
function and δ a predeﬁned threshold value (δ < 1). We say f1 and f2 are similar if
1− sim(a, b) < δ.
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3.3.2 Building Blocks
In this section, we extend the existing representations introduced in Section 3.2 to form
the building blocks of SIG.
A. Structural Information Control Flow Graph
As mentioned in Section 3.2, traditional CFGs consist of basic blocks each of which
is a sequence of instructions terminating with a branch instruction. We can thus only
obtain the structure of a function from a CFG. The lack of more detailed information in
CFGs means two entirely different functions may yield the same CFG, which will cause
confusion for identifying similar functions. Therefore, we extend standard CFGs with a
colored scheme based on structural information about the probable role or functionality of
each node. For example, if the majority of instructions in one node is arithmetic or logical,
it may provide hints about the functionality of the node (e.g., cryptographic function
usually involves a large number of for loops). By enriching standard CFGs with such
information as different colors of nodes, which we call iCFG, we have a better chance
to distinguish two functions even if they have the same CFG structure. Table 3.1 shows
some example categories of structural information we consider in coloring the nodes.
The assignment of classes depends on two percentages: (i) the two highest per-
centages, and (ii) the lowest percentage, among the proposed categories. By consider-
ing the highest percentages, we aim to measure the majority category in the function.
We choose two highest percentages because we have noticed that some classes, such as
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Table 3.1: Structural information categories
Category Description
Data Transfer (DT) Data transfer instructions such as mov, movzx, movsx
Test(T) Test instructions such as cmp, test
ArLo
Arithmetic and logical instructions such as add, sub,
mul, div, imul, idiv, and, or, xor, sar,
shr
CaLe System call, API call, and Load effective instructions such as
lea
Stack Stack instructions such as push, pop
Data Transfer, are always dominant in many cases such that considering in addition
the second highest percentage would provide more reliable coloring. Table 3.2 shows
some example colored classes. The second row in Table 3.2 shows three classes 1, 2, and
3. For example class 2 occurs when the majority is DT, T and minority is Stack.
Table 3.2: Color classes for iCFG
Color Classes Majority Minority
1/2/3 DT, T ArLo/Stack/CaLe
4/5/6 DT, ArLo T/CaLe/Stack
7/8/9 DT, CaLe ArLo/Stack/T
10/11/12 DT, Stack T/CaLe/ArLo
13/14/15 T, ArLo DT/CaLe/Stack
16/17/18 T, CaLe DT/ArLo/Stack
19/20/21 T, Stack DT/ArLo/CaLe
22/23/24 ArLo, Stack T/DT/CaLe
25/26/27 ArLo, CaLe Stack/DT/T
28/29/30 Stack, Cale T/DT/ArLo
As an example, by applying the color classes in Table 3.2 to Figure 3.1(a), we
can obtain the iCFG shown in Figure 3.3(a). This iCFG involves ﬁve color classes:
22, 4, 3, 10, and 1. From Table 3.2, we can see that a majority of those classes be-
long to: ArLo-Stack, DT-ArLo, DT-T, DT-Stack, DT-T. This is reasonable
since the main functionality of the bubble sort algorithm is manipulating values in an array
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and consequently the main action is the transfer of values from one location to another,
which explains the large number of DT instructions. As demonstrated by the example, by
using this extended control ﬂow graph iCFG, we can capture more semantic information
that might be helpful in identifying functions in binary code. Nonetheless, the iCFG
only contains control information about basic blocks, and it lacks other useful semantics,
such as the way registers are manipulated and the way functions interact with each other.






































Figure 3.3: Enhanced classical representations for bubble sort function: (a) iCFG for
bubble sort function (b) mRFG for bubble sort function (c) Function Call Graph for bubble
sort function
B. Merged Register Flow Graph
As mentioned in Section 3.2, RFG is a binary code representation for capturing program
behaviors based on an important semantics of the code, i.e., how registers are manip-
ulated. The original RFG is designed for authorship attribution purposes, therefore it
lacks support for some cases that are important for function identiﬁcation: i) when both
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operands of cmp are constants (C), ii) when one of the operands is a constant and the
other is a register (reg), iii) when both operands are memory locations (ML), iv) when one
of the operands is a memory location and the other is a register, and v) when the operands
are a mixture of constants and memory locations. These cases are especially important
for identifying functions in binary code, and hence we extend the RFG by adding several
new classes as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Updated classes of register access
Class Arithmetic Logical Generic Stack C C C Reg ML ML ML Reg ML C
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Moreover, as another improvement over the originalRFG representation, we merge
certain nodes inside anRFG, e.g., class one and class two together are equivalent to class
ﬁve. In this manner, we can reduce the number of nodes to improve the efﬁciency in an-
alyzing an RFG. Finally, since the original RFG depends only on the cmp instructions,
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we also extend RFG instructions to the test instruction. After applying those extensions
and modiﬁcations, we obtain the new representation mRFG, as shown in Figure 3.3(b).
The mRFG has three more nodes than its corresponding RFG; one of these is test
instruction, and the other two are related to the immediate memory address and the con-
stant. Moreover, we have merged the original classes (nodes in green): C8 − C3 to C8,
C1 − C1 to C1, and C5 − C14 to C11. The reference to the new classes C17 and C19
may provide useful semantics about the functions, e.g., a bubble sort function implies it
mainly deals with constants and sorts them in memory locations.
C. Color Function Call Graph
As mentioned in Section 3.2, traditional FCGs represent system calls in a binary code.
Among a set of system callsC = C1, C2, . . . , Cn, each call may be either local or external.
To distinguish these, we extend FCGs with a color scheme as follows. The label function
of labeling edges deﬁnes the label class α in two cases. For a local call, we only need
one label, because local system calls are mostly related to compiler functions rather than
to user functions. As to external calls, we deﬁne the label classes using a range of values
0 < α < 1, because we may have various external system calls potentially connecting to
API that is very important for identifying functions. More precisely, we extend FCGs to





α = 0 if l is local system call
0 < α < 1 if l is external system call
As an example, having applied this new representation to our running example, we
obtain the cFCG shown in Figure 3.3(c). Besides serving as a building block of our
proposed approach, the cFCG representation may also be helpful in other related tasks
by highlighting the difference between various types of calls, such as in malware classi-
ﬁcation through clustering external system calls, and for writing pattern-based signatures
by providing analysts with a list of API call graph properties derived from external calls.
3.3.3 SIG: Semantic Integrated Graph
The building blocks introduced in the previous section provide complementary views
on binary code by emphasizing different aspects of the underlying function semantics.
Inspired by the work introduced in [126], in which different representations of source
code are combined for vulnerability detection in source code (which is a different problem
from ours as binary code lacks much of the useful information available in source code),
we combine those different but complementary representations of binary code into a joint
data structure in order to facilitate more efﬁcient graph matching between different binary
codes for identifying reused functions. Formally, a semantic integrated graph (SIG) is
deﬁned as follows.
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Deﬁnition 3. A semantic graphG = (N ,V ,ζ ,γ,ϑ,λ,ω) is a directed attributed graph where
N is a set of nodes, V ⊆ (N ×N ) is a set of edges and ζ is edge labeling function which
assigns a label to each edge: ζ −→ γ, where γ is a set of labels. ϑ is a coloring function
which colors each node n  N based on statistical classes function λ. Finally, ω is a
function for coloring mRFG.
Figure 3.4 shows a simple example of SIG with four nodes. Note that a SIG is a
multigraph so two nodes may be connected by multiple edges, e.g., edges corresponding
to mRFG or cFCG. Moreover, A,B,C,D represent the outcomes of labeling nodes
of function ϑ, and a, b, c are the outcomes of function ζ . C1, C5, C2, and C11 are
outcomes of function ω. In the ﬁgure, the number in an oval shape represents the number
of outcomes of the color function for cFCG, where 0 represents a local call, and α1 and
















Figure 3.4: Simple example of SIG
To utilize the SIG for inexact matching and matching for fragments of function, we
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need to consider meaningful subgraphs of SIG. Again inspired by [126], we decompose
a SIG into short paths called traces, where each trace is a function  : S(N) −→ S(N ′)
that maps a set of nodes in an SIG to another set of nodes according to given criteria,
where S(N) denotes the power set of N . The main advantage of such a deﬁnition is the
composition of multiple traces always yields another trace, i.e., 0 and 1 can be chained
together to 0 ◦ 1. We deﬁne a number of elementary traces that serve as a basis for the
construction of other traces, and some examples are shown in the following (each trace









{m : (n,m)  V and ϑ(n,m) = I and λ(n,m) = L and
ω(n,m) = K}
OR(1, 2, ..., n) = 1 ∪ 2 ∪ ...∪ n
AND(1, 2, ..., n) = 1 ∩ 2 ∩ ...∩ n
The trace OutI,L,K returns all nodes reachable over edge I and connected to the
node of the other graph with label L, all nodes connected with the node of the other graph
with label K. Trace INI,L,K is similarly deﬁned to move backwards in the graph, and the
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two traces OR and AND aggregate the outputs of other traces.
Example: SIG for Bubble Sort Function. Here, we give an example of SIG for




















Figure 3.5: SIG for bubble sort function
As an example of SIG trace, we show the traces of nodes 22, 4, and 3 in
Table 3.4. Also, we show just one example of OR trace and AND trace as well. More-
over, we extract additional features from the SIG shown in Figure 3.5, as depicted in
Table 3.5. The features in Table 3.5 include total number of nodes, number of control
edges(e.g., 22), number of ﬂow edges (e.g., 0), number of ﬂow nodes (e.g., C8), and etc.
Those features together with the SIG traces are sufﬁcient for exact matching of SIGs,
and we will discuss inexact matching in next section.
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Table 3.4: Part of traces for SGF bubble sort function
Node Traces Traces Type
22 , , C8 out
t in
4 f, C14 out
, f in
22 OR 4 , C8, C14, f out
f, t,  in
4 AND 3 f out
f in
Table 3.5: Graph features for exact matching
Features Frequency
Total # of Nodes 15
Total # of Edges 18
# of Control Nodes 5
# of Control Edges 8
# of Call Nodes 4
# of Call Edges 4
# of Register Nodes 6
# of Register Nodes 6
3.3.4 Graph Edit Distance
For inexact matching between SIGs, we will need a distance metric. In this chapter, we
employ the graph edit distance for this purpose. The edit distance between two graphs
measures their similarity in terms of the number of edits needed to transform one into the
other [71]. We implement this concept as follows. Given two SIGs, we deﬁne the follow-
ing two elementary traces to transform one graph into another: Edge-edit traces,
including κr, re-labels the edge. Node-edit traces, including νr, re-colors the node
by merging nodes from the other graph into one node. An edit edge VG,H between two
SIGs G and H is deﬁned as a set of sequences (1, 2, ... , n) of traces such that G = n
43
(1(n−1(H)(... 1(H) ...)). To quantify this similarity, the weight of all edit traces is mea-
sured, i.e., V = (n, 2, ... , n) as w(V ) =
∑n
i=1w(i). The edit distance between two
SIGs is thus deﬁned as the minimum weight of all edit edges and nodes between them,
i.e., sim(G,H) = min w(VG,H). The distance measure between the nodes follows the
same reasoning, with operations instead of traces. In Algorithm 1, we calculate the graph
edit distance between two SIGs, G and H , by measuring the cost of transforming G to
H . The algorithm starts by labeling the edges of the two graphs as mentioned earlier, and
then checks the cost of transforming each node in G to nodes in H , and ﬁnally calculates
the total cost.
Algorithm 1: Graph Edit Distance
input : G: semantic integrated graph
H: semantic integrated graph
R: total set of edges
e: last element of edges
output: sim: Similarity result for two graphs
begin
Steps 1 and 2 for edge labeling
1. (G, V ′) ← ExtractEdges (G, V );
2. (H,V ”) ← ExtractEdges (H,V );
for each vi in V ′ do
for each vj in V ” do
if vj . = vi. then
sim(G,H) ←  in vj ;
for each r in R do
for each 1 < e do
w(V ) ← w (i);
return sim(G,H) = minw(VG,H)
We deﬁne the dissimilarity between two SIGs G and H as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. The dissimilarity ρ(G,H) between two SIGs is a value in [0, 1], where
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|NG|+ |NH |+ |VG|+ |VH |+ |G|+ |H |
Where w(VG,H) is the weight cost of traces, |NG| the number of nodes in G, |NH |
the number of nodes in H , |VG| the number of edges in G, |VH | the number of edges in











Figure 3.6: Similarity statistics of function variants
3.4 Experimental Results
We implement and test the proposed technique, SIGMA, with variants of sorting algo-
rithms and encryption algorithms in order to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness
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of the proposed method. We employed two variants for each sort function (e.g., bubble,
quick, merge, and heap) and two for each encryption algorithm (e.g., RC4, MD5, Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the tiny encryption algorithm (TEA)). Using the
proposed method, similar scores among these samples are calculated based on the graph
edit distance and dissimilarity formulas introduced in previous section. The results are
depicted in Figure 3.6.

















































Figure 3.7: (a) Relation between the number of variants with the similarity score (b)
Accuracy of using exact and approximate matching
According to Figure 3.6, the similarity score shows a promising value with about
80% similarity score pairs ranging from 0.42 to 1. Furthermore, the similarity score on
pairs ranging from 0 to 0.2 is only about 10%. The results clearly show that our approach
can capture common characteristics between functions relatively well. The occurrences
of low-score pairs are mainly due to the signiﬁcant differences in sizes of functions and
variants, and also the number of nodes, edges, and traces may be observably different. For
instance, the number of nodes in a bubble sort variant a is 15, whereas for variant b is 22;
the number of edges in each one is 18 and 43, and the number of traces is 147 and 278,
respectively. In Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, the similarity matrix shows similar scores of each
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pair of encryption functions. The values (100%) in the main diagonal are the similarity
scores for the variants when compared to themselves. In both tables, we represent RC4 by
R, TEA by T, AES by A, MD5 by M, Bubble by B, Quick by Q, Heap by H, and Merge
by M.
Table 3.6: Similarity between sort function variants
B.1 B.2 Q.1 Q.2 M.1 M.2 H.1 H.2
B.1 100% 93% 71% 67% 62% 73% 65% 62%
B.2 96% 100% 79% 80% 70% 72% 60% 68%
Q.1 79% 83% 100% 94% 76% 71% 65% 60%
Q.2 71% 69% 95% 100% 79% 77% 74% 65%
M.1 67% 76% 66% 68% 100% 97% 70% 74%
M.2 73% 69% 77% 78% 94% 100% 70% 72%
H.1 69% 67% 74% 73% 79% 79% 100% 96%
H.2 72% 71% 64% 69% 79% 78% 95% 100%
Table 3.7: Similarity between encryption function variants
R.1 R.2 T.1 T.2 M.1 M.2 A.1 A.2
R.1 100% 86% 68% 57% 52% 61% 57% 62%
R.2 89% 100% 74% 66% 53% 72% 50% 59%
T.1 72% 79% 100% 87% 66% 61% 55% 67%
T.2 68% 62% 89% 100% 72% 67% 69% 55%
M.1 57% 69% 58% 51% 100% 91% 78% 74%
M.2 63% 67% 67% 70% 92% 100% 78% 72%
A.1 69% 57% 64% 68% 79% 75% 100% 94%
A.2 62% 71% 69% 64% 70% 73% 89% 100%
We can see from Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 that similarity scores among the sort func-
tions are higher than those among encryption functions. This is due to the fact that the
steps of sorting are similar among different algorithms but the steps of encryption func-
tions vary signiﬁcantly with each algorithm.
In Table 3.6, the similarity between heap and other algorithms are lower, because
the steps of heap sort are signiﬁcantly different from the other sorting algorithms’ steps.
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Table 3.8: Dissimilarity between sort and encryption functions
Bubble.1 Quick.1 Merge.1 Heap.1
RC4.1 86% 93% 79% 87%
TEA.1 96% 91% 79% 89%
MD5.1 79% 88% 90% 94%
AES.1 89% 91% 95% 84%
In Table 3.7, the similarity scores show that RC4 is more similar to TEA, than MD5 is to
AES. This is due to the fact that RC4 and TEA have steps in common in the encryption
process. In Table 3.8, we list the calculated dissimilarity scores between sorting algo-
rithms and encryption algorithms.
3.5 Summary
The reverse engineering of binary code is an important but challenging task that de-
mands automated techniques for preprosessing and cleaning the code. The identiﬁcation
of reused functions in binary code is one of the important aspect of this issue that has
received limited attention in comparison with other aspects of binary analysis. In this
chapter, we have presented a novel approach called SIGMA for effectively identifying
reused functions in binary code. Instead of relying on one source of information, our ap-
proach combines multiple representations into one joint data structure SIG. SIGMA also
supports inexact matching and exact matching based on traces of the SIG which deals
with function fragments. Both experimental results and case study have demonstrated the
effectiveness of our method, and we have described several potential improvements to the
approach in the previous section.
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Chapter 4
Identifying Free Open-Source Software
Functions in Binary Code
4.1 Overview
Identifying free open-source software (FOSS) packages on binaries when the source code
is unavailable is important for many security applications, such as malware detection, soft-
ware infringement, authorship attribution, and digital forensics. This capability enhances
both the accuracy and the efﬁciency of reverse engineering tasks by avoiding false correla-
tions between irrelevant code bases. Although the FOSS package identiﬁcation problem
belongs to the ﬁeld of software engineering, conventional approaches rely strongly on
practical methods in data mining and database searching. However, various challenges
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in the use of these methods prevent existing function identiﬁcation approaches from be-
ing effective in the absence of source code. To make matters worse, the introduction of
code transformation techniques, the use of different compilers and compilation settings,
and software refactoring techniques has made the automated detection of FOSS packages
increasingly difﬁcult. With very few exceptions, the existing systems are not resilient to
such techniques, and the exceptions are not sufﬁciently efﬁcient.
To address this issue, this chapter proposes, FOSSIL, a novel resilient and efﬁcient
system that incorporates three components. The ﬁrst component extracts the syntactical
features of functions by considering opcode frequencies and applying a hidden Markov
model statistical test. The second component applies a neighborhood hash graph kernel to
random walks derived from control ﬂow graphs, with the goal of extracting the semantics
of the functions. The third component applies z-score to the normalized instructions to
extract the behavior of instructions in a function. The components are integrated using a
Bayesian network model which synthesizes the results to determine the FOSS function.
The novel approach of combining these components using the Bayesian network has pro-
duced stronger resilience to code transformation methods. We evaluate our system on
two datasets including real-world projects whose use of FOSS packages is known and
malware binaries for which there are security and reverse engineering reports purporting
to describe their use of FOSS. We demonstrate that our system is able to identify FOSS
packages in real-world projects with a mean precision of 0.95 and with a mean recall of
0.85. Furthermore, FOSSIL is able to discover FOSS packages in malware binaries that
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match those listed in security and reverse engineering reports.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we show the challenges faced in automating the process of identifying
FOSS functions in malware binaries. Second, we brieﬂy describe the threat model and
highlight the in-scope and out-of-scope threats of this work. We then provide an overview
of our system. Finally, we present our criteria in selecting FOSS packages for evaluation.
4.2.1 Challenges
In automating the process of identifying FOSS functions in malware binaries, several
challenges are typically encountered. The ﬁrst is usability. Immediate insights obtained
about a binary ﬁle from a system to highlight FOSS packages will give reverse engineers
a direction to start their investigations. The existing approaches for the purpose of binary
search engine, clone detection, or function identiﬁcation return the top-ranked candidate
functions, while these results are helpful if the repository contains a function that exhibits
a high degree of similarity to the target function. Moreover, because of the effect of dif-
ferent compilers, compiler optimization, and obfuscation techniques, a given unknown
function is less likely to be very similar to the right function in the repository, and there
is little advantage in returning a list of matches with low degrees of similarity. A resilient
system should be able to identify the matched pairs with a controller process that can syn-
thesize the available knowledge. The second challenge is efﬁciency. An efﬁcient system
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can help reverse engineers to ﬁnd matches on the ﬂy. To efﬁciently extract, index, and
match features from program binaries in order to detect a given target function within a
reasonable time, considering the fact that many known matching approaches imply a high
complexity is challenging. The third challenge is robustness. The distortion of features
in the binary ﬁle may be attributed to different sources arising from the platform, the
compiler, or the programming language, which may change the structures, syntax, or se-
quences of features. Hence, it is challenging to extract robust features that would be less
affected by different compilers, slight changes in the source code as well as obfuscation
techniques. The fourth challenge is scalability. Reverse engineers deal with large num-
bers of binaries on a daily basis, so it is necessary to design a system that could scale up
millions of binary functions. Accordingly, it is important to consider the factors that may
degrade the performance of FOSS package identiﬁcation as the repository size increases.
The ﬁfth challenge is stability. One of the most important concerns in the design of a
system is to provide a component to update the repository, when a new version of a FOSS
package is released. The update process should be supported by a system that does not
need to re-index the whole package.
4.2.2 Threat Model
Our system is designed to assist, instead of replace, reverse engineers in various use cases,
such as digital forensic analysis (e.g., clustering a group of functions based on similar
ﬁngerprints) or software vulnerability disclosure (e.g., linking the code fragment of a
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binary to a known vulnerable/buggy function). In what follows, we further clarify the
threat model and scope of this thesis.
In-Scope Threats. In designing the features and methodology of our system, we have
taken into consideration certain potential threats. First, adversaries may intentionally ap-
ply code transformation techniques to alter the syntax of binary ﬁles. Second, since the
syntax of a program binary can be signiﬁcantly altered by simply changing the compilers
or compilation settings, adversaries may make such changes to evade detection. Finally,
adversaries may reuse FOSS packages through modifying and adapting them to intention-
ally avoid detection by our system. We show how our system resists and survives these
threats in Section 4.4.7. Furthermore, we can certainly envision many countermeasures
taken by future malware writers to evade detection by our system, and hardening our
system against such countermeasures will be an ongoing process.
Out-of-Scope Threats. As previously mentioned, our system is not intended to com-
pletely replace reverse engineers. Thus, the focus of our system is not on general reverse
engineering tasks, such as unpacking and de-obfuscating binaries (although we later dis-
cuss how our system handles some obfuscation methods intended to evade detection by
our system), but rather on discovering user functions. Our system assumes the binary is
already de-obfuscated. In addition, cases where the code is encrypted in order to reduce
code size or to prevent reverse engineering are also out of the scope of our system.
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4.2.3 System Overview
The main analytical process is divided into four stages, as shown in Figure 4.1.
push   eax
mov    eax, esp
add     eax, 04G
CC
push   eax
mov    eax, esp







































mov   R, R
add    R, VG
CC
push   R
mov    R, R
add     R, VVS
Normalization
Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed system
A preprocessing stage prepares normalized disassembled instructions, followed by
feature extraction once the FOSS packages are collected. Then, different detection meth-
ods are applied to the extracted features, and the repository is explored for the purpose
of identiﬁcation. Further, the results of these detection methods are integrated using a
Bayesian network model, making it possible to identify FOSS functions and label them
in the binary. In the ﬁrst step, the assembly instructions are normalized. The second step
extracts opcodes, CFG-walks, and opcode frequency distribution features (Section 4.3.1).
A Bayesian network controls the application of different detection methods, including
HMM, HSP, and z-score, to the extracted features (Section 4.3.3). More speciﬁcally, the
input of ﬁrst method (HMM) is function opcodes, which are normalized according to the
function length. A hidden Markov model (HMM) is applied to these opcode frequencies,
as it can efﬁciently detect the behavior of a function (Section 4.3.3). The second method,
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HSP, accepts control ﬂow graph walks, which are labelled by applying the kernel func-
tion for each node together with its neighbors efﬁciently, as described in Section 4.3.3.
Depending on the output of this component, either the function is identiﬁed, or the third
component of the model is checked. To achieve this, the opcode frequencies are used
as input and are converted into a probability function whose characteristics are analysed
with the use of z-score, as described in Section 4.3.3. These statistical features usually
capture the relationship between instructions and the behavior of the function. Finally, as
described in Section 4.4, we evaluate our approach in terms of efﬁciency against a set of
FOSS packages compiled with different compilers and compilation settings as well as in
terms of robustness against code transformation techniques.
4.2.4 FOSS Packages
Collecting FOSS packages is a crucial step in evaluating our system. To build a reposi-
tory of FOSS functions, the packages are chosen using statistics that show the prevalence
of FOSS libraries [20], studies of malware behavior [49, 68, 127, 129], and technical re-
ports [38,85,97]. We either collect the executable ﬁles or compile these packages accord-
ing to their dependencies. We tailor our system to C-family compilers because of their
popularity and widespread use, especially in the development of malicious programs [88].
The FOSS packages were created to perform various functionalities as partially listed in
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Example of FOSS packages
Functionality
Compression (e.g., info-zip) MSDN libraries (e.g., NSPR)
Database management (e.g., SQLite) Network operations (e.g., webhp)
Encryption (e.g., TrueCrypt) Random number generation (e.g., Mersenne Twister)
File manipulation (e.g., libjsoncpp) Secure connection (e.g., libssh2)
Hashing (e.g., Hashdeep) Secure protocol (e.g., openssl)
Image compression (e.g., openjpeg) Terminal emulation (e.g., xterm)
Multimedia protocols (e.g., Libavutil) XML parser (e.g., TinyXML)
4.3 Design and Implementation of Our System
In this section, we introduce our system design and describe the features in detail. We
also provide an overview of the implementation environment.
4.3.1 Features
In what follows, we introduce opcodes, CFG-walks, and opcode frequency distribution
features used in our system.
Opcodes. Opcodes are deﬁned as operational codes, which can be used to efﬁciently
detect obfuscated or metamorphic malware [40]. However, Bilar et al. show that preva-
lent opcodes (e.g., mov, push, and call) do not make good indicators of malware
samples [40], and based on such opcode frequencies, the resultant degree of similarity
between two ﬁles could potentially be marred [55]. Therefore, we propose a way to avoid
this phenomenon and to give each opcode its actual relevance by applying feature ranking
based on mutual information [105] in order to consider only the top-ranked opcodes.
Control Flow Graph Walks. Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) consist of a set of basic
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blocks, each of which represents a sequence of instructions without an intervening con-
trol transfer instruction. In the literature, CFGs have been used to detect variants of mal-
ware [46]. Exact matching of the CFG itself does not offer much help towards our goal,
since the CFG might change, for instance, due to the effect of compilers and optimization
settings. Consequently, we decompose a CFG into a set of walks, taking into consider-
ation the interactions within these walks. By doing so, we will be able to convert CFGs
into a set of semantic relations (walk interactions) such that when a malware uses part of a
FOSS function to implement a speciﬁc functionality, it would be captured based on these
semantic relations. In the literature, the random walk kernel [69] and the shortest path
kernel [122] are amongst the most prominent graph kernels that have been used. A graph
is decomposed into sequences of nodes generated by walks; it counts the number of iden-
tical walks that can be found in two graphs. We propose an instance of the substructure
ﬁngerprint kernel suitability for the analysis of CFG walk relations.
Example: Suppose a CFG consisting of ten basic blocks (BB0, · · · , BB9) as shown in
Figure 4.2a. To illustrate the random walk selection, we consider two nodes BB0 and
BB7, where the path between them (BB0,BB4,BB6,BB7) with a distance of 3 is high-
lighted in Figure 4.2b. To reduce time complexity, we consider a radius for our random
walk, which is the shortest path with neighboring nodes. In our experiments, we consider
radius = {0, 1, 2}, as illustrated in Figures 4.2b-d, respectively. By choosing the radius
equal to 0, the information is only about nodeBB0 and nodeBB7 as shown in Figure 4.2b.
When r = 1 the (BB0, BB4), and (BB6, BB7) pairs represent the structural information
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depicted in Figure 4.2c. The walks when radius is equal to 2 are (BB0, BB4, BB6), and
(BB4, BB6, BB7). Through our experiments, we ﬁnd that a radius of 2 is the best choice





































Figure 4.2: Example of random walks between two nodes BB0 and BB7 in (a) CFG of a
function, by considering three radius (r) values: (b) r = 0, (c) r = 1, and (d) r = 2
Opcode Frequency Distribution. We select the opcode frequency distribution feature
based on the following observations obtained from our experiments. We ﬁrst consider the
simple hypothesis that FOSS functions performing the same task usually exhibit similar
distributions of opcodes [40]. Second, considering the fact that the area under a fre-
quency distribution curve is always 1, we calculate the percentage of top-ranked opcode
frequencies under the distribution. Third, the distribution of various opcodes conforms to
a consistent distribution shape [51] when it is related to a speciﬁc FOSS function, even if




We are interested in extracting features that represent the functionality and semantics
of binary functions. We extract different representations of code properties, but only a
subset of these representations may serve as indicators of the semantics of a function.
Hence, we aim to select features that best preserve the semantics of a function. As such,
instead of relying only on syntax-based features obtained from feature templates [63], we
propose capturing different function features at various abstraction levels of the binary
code. Furthermore, we consider how to efﬁciently extract features from binaries and how
to efﬁciently store them in a repository.
Opcode ranking. The ﬁrst category of our features are opcodes. By applying mutual
information-based ranking [45] to the opcodes and corresponding functions of each FOSS
family, we reduce the feature set size to effectively represent the properties of coding
functionality. The opcodes with highest ranking values will be used to calculate opcode
frequency distributions and to color CFG-walks. We employ mutual information to deter-
mine the degree of statistical dependence of two variables X and Y as follows:










where x is the opcode frequency, y is the class of FOSS function (e.g.
sqlite3MemMalloc), p(x) and p(y) are the marginal probability distribution of each
random variable, and p(x, y) is the joint probability of X and Y [113]. The joint and
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marginal distributions are computed over the number of function variants N (For each
function we have different versions such as when it is compiled with VS or GCC). These



















Graph coloring. Relying on structural information to identify functions which are se-
mantically similar is not sufﬁcient given the fact that two distinct functions may still have
identical CFGs [29]. This shortcoming is addressed by the idea of graph coloring, where
the content of each basic block is also taken into consideration. We use the graph color-
ing technique proposed in [84] to color the nodes based on the group of instructions in a
basic block. This technique categorizes the instructions according to their semantics; for
instance, push and pop opcodes are classiﬁed in one class (e.g., Stack operation). As a
result, there are fewer possibilities for an attacker to ﬁnd semantically equivalent instruc-
tions from different classes. Furthermore, the possible variations in coloring that can be
generated with instructions from different classes are much fewer than the possible vari-
ations on the instruction level [84]. We apply the coloring technique on the normalized
instructions (including the opcodes and operands) by considering only the top-ranked op-
codes. Finally, we assign a weight to each edge by aggregating the colors of the source
and destination nodes. For instance, if there is an edge between node A to node B, and
they are colored in 2 and 8 respectively, the weight of this edge would be 10.
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Opcode importance. We follow the model used in [40] to measure the importance of op-
codes. The top-ranked opcodes are further processed through converting the frequencies
into a histogram and measuring the area of intersection based on the probability distri-
bution. This step illustrates the importance of each ranked opcode in terms of function
behavior. The most important opcodes will be used by the third component.
4.3.3 Detection Method
In this section, we introduce the components of our detection system: the hidden Markov
model, the neighborhood hash graph kernel, and the z-score, where the Bayesian network
integrates these components.
A. Hidden Markov Model
After the mutual information between the FOSS function and the individual opcodes is
computed, an opcode relevance ﬁle based on the top-ranked features for each function is
created. These top-ranked opcodes are used for the hidden Markov model (HMM) with
chi-squared testing. Thus, the functions are scored (according to the opcode sequences)
and classiﬁed based on whether they belong to the FOSS or not. Following this, we
apply chi-squared distance with a HMM, as a way to create a conﬁdence interval for this
component. HMM was picked to be the initial component since it is computationally
efﬁcient [121].
In the HMM model, the states represent the sequence of instructions, however, they
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are not fully observed; yet, the hidden states can be estimated by observing the sequences
of data [120]. To discover the hidden states (e.g., instructions related to inline functions),
we apply data ﬂow analysis such as read and write dependencies as what follows. There
exists a data ﬂow dependency between two instructions i1 and i2 according to the fol-
lowing rules: (i) i1 reads from a register or a memory address, and i2 writes to the same
register or memory address. (ii) i1 writes to a register or memory address and, i2 writes to
the same register or memory. (iii) i1 writes to a register or memory address, and i2 reads
from the same register or memory. Consequently, if an instruction (or set of commands)
shows no evidence of a data ﬂow dependency, it is tagged as a hidden state. It should be
noted that “instruction side effect” (which ﬂag is manipulated) are treated as observations.
Therefore, such observations will be annotated to the states.
In what follows, we describe the chi-squared distance, which is combined with the
HMM. The main objective is to determine the preeminent characteristics of the probability
distribution of statistical opcode variable Z. The best way to ﬁnd out which hypothesis is
the best match for an observed sequence of samples (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) is to use statistical
testing. In fact, the Pearson’s χ2 statistic [65] is widely employed to conﬁrm whether or
not the discrepancies between the observed and expected data are signiﬁcant. We denote






≤ χ2(α, v − 1) (4.1)
where mˆi and mi are the normalized frequencies of opcodes in the testing phase and
62
training phase, respectively; (α, v − 1) represent type I error rate, and the degrees of
freedom, respectively. Finally, based on the comparison results of T 2 and χ2(α, v − 1),
the decision threshold is acquired. For more details, we refer the reader to [120,121].
B. Neighborhood Hash Graph Kernel
As Gartner et al. [69] show, the distance between CFG-walks (node-node interaction rela-
tions) has a crucial impact on obtaining the semantics of a graph. To be more precise and
to take into consideration the subgraph pairs (not only pairs), we apply a hash subgraph
pairwise (HSP) [132] kernel based method to represent the structural information of the
node interactions in a linear time using hierarchical hash labels.





τq|{w ∈ Wq(H) : f1(w) = li ∧ fq+1(w) = lj}| (4.2)
where Wq(H) is the set of all possible walks with q edges in graph H , f1(w) is the ﬁrst
node of walk w, fq+1(w) is the last node of walk w, and (τ0, τ1, · · · , τq) are weights of
edges. Each edge is weighted by the summation of source and destination node colors
(e.g., c(i) + c(i + 1), where function c calculates the node color, discussed in Section
4.3.2). In correspondence with feature map provided above, the graph kernel function
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based on label pairs is calculated as in [132] as follows:
K(H,H
′








































where Ei is the adjacency matrix of H , and L is the labeled matrix of H .
The manner by which the label process is made is described as follows. We denote
a label as a binary vector e = {u1, u2, . . . , ur} consisting of r-bits (0 or 1), representing
the presence (1) of the group of instructions (discussed in Section 4.3.2) in a node. Let
XOR(ei, ej) = ei⊕ej symbolise theXOR operation between two bit vectors of ei and ej .
Let ROTo(e) = {uo+1, uo+2, . . . , ur, u1, . . . , uo} denote the rotation (ROTo) operation
for e = {u1, u2, . . . , ur}, which shifts the last r− o bits to the left by o bits and moves the
ﬁrst o bits to the right.
In order to compute the neighborhood hash of a graph, we ﬁrst obtain the set of ad-
jacent nodesNadj(n) = {Nadj1 , . . . , Nadjd } for each node n, and then calculate a neighbor-
hood subgraph hash label for every node, using the following equation 4.4 [133], where
li(n) indicates bit label of node n.
li+1(n) = NH(n) = ROT1(li(n))⊕ (ROTo)(li(Nadj1 ))⊕ · · · ⊕ROTo(li(Nadjd )) (4.4)
As a way to differentiate between an outgoing and an ingoing edge, we set two
ROTo operations. If the edge n1n is an incoming edge to node n, let ROTo = ROT2; if
the edge nn1 is an outgoing edge of node n, let ROTo = ROT3. It is worth nothing that
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l0(n) describes the information of node n, while l1(n) represents the label distribution of
node n and its adjacent nodes. Finally, the structural information of subgraph of radius i
is presented by li(n). According to our experiments, we ﬁnd a radius of r = 2 is the best
choice for our system.

























































where E is the adjacency matrix of H and L0, L1, . . . , Lr are the hierarchical hash labels
of H . For more details, we refer the reader to [132,133].
From a practical perspective, the whole process involved in calculating hierarchical
hash labels is linear with respect to the size of the graph [132, 133]. Consequently, com-
puting the similarity between two control ﬂow graphs will be equivalent to comparing the
set of hash values.
C. Calculation of Z-score
The last component concerns the distribution of opcode frequencies, since each set of
opcodes that belong to a speciﬁc function will likely follow a speciﬁc distribution due
to the functionality they implement. For this purpose, we utilize the z-score in order to
convert these distributions into scores. In essence, a z-score Z = (x−μ)
SD
indicates how
many standard deviations an element is from the mean.
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We calculate the z-score for each opcode distribution to facilitate accurate compar-
isons. Based on the possible values for the z-score, we obtain a curve distribution, where
the area under the curve provides one feature value for each function. The area under the
curve is calculated as P (min < Z < max) = P (Z < max)− P (Z > min).
D. Bayesian Network Model
We use a Bayesian Network (BN) model for measuring the knowledge obtained from each
component and for automating the interaction amongst these components. In addition,
BN can depict the relations between the three proposed components, and would encode
probabilistic relationships among their outputs. Moreover, situations where certain data
for such components are not sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation can be handled by BN. A BN
can be used to gain knowledge from a FOSS function identiﬁcation problem domain as
well as to predict the consequences of intervention, since it can be used to learn causal
relationships. This feature is very important in the case of modiﬁcations performed by
malware writers. Hence, the BN can capture both causal and probabilistic relationships,
and is an ideal representation for combining prior knowledge and data.
The joint probability function would be calculated as P (f,H,W,Z) =






where p (x|y) is the probability of a possible input x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Υn given the output
y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Γn. We deﬁne a set of conditional probabilities (factors) Ψ1,Ψ2, and
Ψ3 for our three components. Through extensive experiments applying logistic regression
[50], we found that, for our experimental settings, the best values for these factors are
0.45, 0.35, and 0.2, respectively. These factors are based on all possible features in the
components, and thus represent more explicitly the underlying probability distribution
of the features in each component. Each part of the joint probability is obtained by the
equation 4.7.



















As previously described, our system encompasses three main components to iden-
tify a FOSS function f : HMM (H), CFG-walks (W ), and z-score (Z). Each component
provides particular knowledge about the FOSS function, and the provided knowledge is
measured by a factor Ψs. If the factor Ψs ≤ Ω, where Ω is a probability threshold value
set by the Bayesian network, then our system is automatically transferred to another com-
ponent, which means that the knowledge obtained from the current component is not
sufﬁcient. In addition, each component has a direct effect on the use of the other one; for
instance, component H has a direct effect on component W . The situation can thus be
modeled with a Bayesian network model.
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where Ψs represents the factor of the component s = {1, 2, 3};
∏
represents the sum-
mation of the product of probabilities from each component; Z is the probability distri-
bution [92]; x is the set of features in each component; and y is the set of functions. We




In this section, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of our system, we test 160 real
projects that reuse FOSS packages. The performance criterion is the accuracy (F2 mea-
sure) with which our system identiﬁes the FOSS functions in malware binaries. In addi-
tion, we examines the effect of code transformation on the proposed system.
4.4.1 Dataset Preparation
We manually gather a collection of FOSS packages from different sources and store them
along with their features in a repository. Developing this repository is the ﬁrst step to-
wards the ultimate goal of building a large index of FOSS packages. To determine which
FOSS packages are most widely incorporated, it is helpful to study code reuse on open
repositories such as Github. The method for selecting the reused code involves assessing
both the most popularly projects and the most reused libraries in modern malware based
on the existing reports. After gathering the list of FOSS packages, we download their
source code and compile them with Visual Studio (VS) 2010, VS 2012, and GNU Com-
piler Collection (GCC) 5.1 compilers. Furthermore, we obtain binaries and their PDBs
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Table 4.2: Excerpt of the selected FOSS packages
Project Version No. Fun. Size(kb) Project Version No. Fun. Size(kb)
7zip/7z 15.14 133 1074 lshw B.02.18 2090 2545
7zip/7z 15.11 133 1068 lzip 1.19 3341 1552
avgntopensslx 14.0.0.4576 3687 976 Mersenne Twister 1.10 321 2608
bzip2 1.0.5 63 40.0 miniz 2.8 327 121
expat 0.0.0.0 357 140 ncat 0.10rc3 462 373
ﬁrefox 44.0 173095 37887 Notepad++ 6.8.8 7796 2015
ﬂtk 1.3.2 7587 2833 Notepad++ 6.8.7 7768 2009
FileZilla 3.27.0.1 97 7701 nspr 4.10.2.0 881 181
glew 1.5.1.0 563 306 nss 27.0.1.5156 5979 1745
Hasher 1.7.0 232 183 openssl 0.9.8 1376 415
hashdeep 4.3 3096 965 pcre3 3.9.0.0 52 48
info-zip/funzip 6.0 79 28 python 3.5.1 1538 28070
info-zip/zip 3.1 343 297 python 2.7.1 358 18200
info-zip/unzip 6.0 230 231 putty/putty 0.66 beta 1506 512
ibavcodec 11.10 719 99875 putty/plink 0.66 beta 1057 332
jsoncpp 0.5.0 1056 13 putty/pscp 0.66 beta 1157 344
lcms 8.0.920.14 668 182 putty/psftp 0.66 beta 1166 352
libcurl 10.2.0.232 1456 427 Qt5Core 2.0.1 17723 3987
libgd 1.3.0.27 883 497 SQLite 11.0.0.379 1252 307
libgmp 0.0.0.0 750 669 tinyXML 2.0.2 533 147
libjpeg 0.0.0.0 352 133 TestSSL 4 565 186
libpng 1.2.51 202 60 TrueCrypt 7.2 1193 2514
libpng 1.2.37 419 254 ultraVNC/vncviewer 1.2.13 4410 2045
libssh2 0.12 429 115 Winedt 9.1 87 8617
libtheora 0.0.0.0 460 226 WinMerge 2.14.0 405 6283
libtiff 3.6.1.1501 728 432 Wireshark 2.0.1 70502 39658
libxml2 27.3000.0.6 2815 1021 xampp 5.6.15 5594 111436
from their ofﬁcial websites (e.g., WireShark); the compiler of these binaries are detected
by a packer tool called ExeinfoPE [3]. We evaluate our approach on a set of binaries,
where a subset of them is detailed in Table 4.2.
4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Our ultimate goal is to discover as many relevant functions as possible with less concern
about false positives, which means that recall has higher priority than precision. Hence,
we choose to use the F2 measure because it weights recall twice as heavily as it weights
precision. The precision, recall, false positive rate (FPR), total accuracy (TA) and F2-













TP + TN + FP + FN




where TP indicates number of relevant functions that are correctly retrieved; FN presents
the number of relevant functions that are not detected; FP indicates the number of irrel-
evant functions that are incorrectly detected; and TN returns the number of irrelevant
functions that are not detected.
In our experimental setup, we split the collected binaries into ten sets, reserving
one as a testing set and using the remaining nine sets as the training set. We repeat this
process 100 times and report the average output of the system in terms of aforementioned
evaluation metrics. These metrics are calculated at function level (Section 4.3.1) and at
project level (Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.4).
4.4.3 Accuracy of FOSSIL
In this subsection, we test FOSSIL in the context of several scenarios: (i) examining the
effect of Bayesian network model; (ii) examining accuracy across different versions of
FOSS packages; and (iii) comparing FOSSIL with existing state-of-the-art solutions.
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A. Effect of Bayesian network model
We evaluate the accuracy of our system by examining it on a randomly collected binaries
compiled with VS 2010, VS 2012, and GCC compilers from our repository. We test
our system and report the precision, recall, and F2 measure metrics. The results are
summarized in Table 4.3, without and with the use of Bayesian network (BN) model.
Table 4.3: Effect of Bayesian network model
Without a BN model With a BN model
Features Prec. Rec. F2 Prec. Rec. F2
Opcodes 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.85
CFG-walks 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.84 0.83 0.83
Opcode distributions 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.81 0.86 0.85
Average/ All together 0.727 0.76 0.75 0.93 0.84 0.86
B. Accuracy across different versions of FOSS packages
We are further interested in evaluating FOSSIL with different versions of FOSS packages.
For this purpose, we collect three different versions of all 160 projects in our repository,
compile them with VS 2010 and test FOSSIL. The average output of the system in terms
of precision, recall, and F2 measure metrics is reported in Table 4.4. The highest obtained
F2 measure is 0.863 which is related to openssl, and the lowest one is 0.727 for lcms.
The low F2 measure for lcms can be attributed to the presence of many small functions
that have been inlined.
Accuracy Interpretation. Our results demonstrate the following points:
1. Pre-processing: Some of the top-ranked opcode features are related to the com-
piler functions (e.g., stack frame setup operations). It is thus necessary to ﬁlter
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Table 4.4: Accuracy results of different versions of FOSS packages
Project Prec. Rec. F2 Project Prec. Rec. F2
SQLite 0.78 0.81 0.803 libxml2 0.76 0.78 0.775
Webph 0.80 0.74 0.751 libjsoncpp 0.84 0.83 0.831
Xterm 0.79 0.81 0.805 Mersenne Twister 0.81 0.79 0.793
Hashdeep 0.81 0.85 0.841 libssh2 0.80 0.79 0.791
TinyXML 0.79 0.74 0.749 openssl 0.83 0.88 0.863
libpng 0.77 0.79 0.785 bzip2 0.79 0.80 0.797
ultraVNC 0.73 0.80 0.785 UCL 0.73 0.9 0.859
lcms 0.81 0.71 0.727 TrueCrypt 0.77 0.79 0.785
libavcodec 0.80 0.82 0.815 liblivemedia 0.80 0.81 0.807
info-zip 0.76 0.79 0.783 Libavutil 0.84 0.86 0.855
Firefox 0.77 0.81 0.802 Expat XML parser 0.80 0.8 0.8
out compiler functions to ensure better precision. Accordingly, in future work, we
will leverage BINCOMP [108] with the current version of FOSSIL to distinguish
compiler-related functions and FOSS-related functions. This will lead to consider-
able time savings and help shift the focus of the analysis to more relevant functions.
2. Project Type: We found that the accuracy of FOSSIL depends on the type of
projects. For instance, in our experiments, FOSSIL achieves high accuracy when
it discovers cryptography libraries since these libraries generally have more arith-
metic and logical operations. Also, FOSSIL is able to identify unique CFG-walks
that are related to certain cryptography operations. In contrast, we found that the ac-
curacy of FOSSIL is slightly lower when it deals with parser libraries because they
have functionalities in common with other libraries. For instance, libucl parser
has common functionality with JSON; moreover, it can be integrated with a script-
ing language, such as lua. In Table 4.4, reasonably good precision is observed
for openSSL, while the precision for libxml2 is 0.76. To tackle the effects of
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project type, we have to integrate more semantic features, e.g., type inference.
3. Project Size: We observed through experiments that the accuracy of our system is
not affected by the size of the function or of the project. For example, a compari-
son of the precision achieved by FOSSIL for Firefox and openSSL (0.77 and
0.83, respectively) with that of libpng and bzip2 (0.77 and 0.79, respectively)
illustrates that our features can be extracted regardless of the size of functions, and
that they can reveal the semantics of any piece of code regardless of its size.
4. Features Extraction Level. Typically, existing methods extract features from only
one code level: instruction, function, or program level. A great advantage of FOS-
SIL is that it extracts features from all levels, making it possible to discover a func-
tion through different aspects. Also, the effect of code transformations such as the
use of different compilers is reduced. In addition, we leverage concepts from bi-
ology to both extract the semantics of structural features and to improve efﬁciency
when we deal with structural features.
5. Parameter Selection. For the Bayesian network model, FOSSIL uses three param-
eters Ψ1, Ψ2, and Ψ3, with values of 0.45, 0.35, and 0.2, respectively. Applying
different values to the Bayesian network model makes it possible to achieve var-
ious trade-offs between precision and recall, as shown in Figure 5. Tuning these
parameters may result in different values for precision and recall.
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4.4.4 Comparison
We compare our system to existing state-of-the-art systems: IDA FLIRT, RENDEZVOUS,
[81], SARVAM [101], BINCLONE [63], TRACY [26,53], SIGMA [29], and LIBV [107].
The code of all aforementioned systems are available, with the exception of REN-
DEZVOUS. We re-implement RENDEZVOUS with paying special attention to the deﬁnition
of its characteristics as well as its stated assumptions.
Table 4.5: Statistics about FLIRT signatures on the FOSS packages
Category No. of Signatures Example
Compression 300 E.g., Zlib, Bzip, UCL, infozip
Encryption 313 E.g., Botan, OpenSSL, TrueCrypt
Graphics 351 E.g., bgfx, openVDB, libpng
Web browser 307 E.g., crow, libOnion, ﬁrefox
Parsing 280 E.g., Expat, LibXml, TinyXml
Multimedia 171 E.g., LibVLC, SDL,
Database 178 E.g, MySQL++, SQLite, LMDB++, redis3m
JSON 204 E.g., json, jbson, libjson, jsonCPP
Networking 591 E.g., Restbed, Libcurl, Putty, WebSocket
Scripting 222 E.g., glew, lua
Math 70 E.g., libgmp
Editors 76 E.g., Notepad++
Hashing 152 E.g., Hashdeep, pHash, blockhash
Total 3215
It is worthy to note that since FLIRT is a signature-based technology, for the sake of
comparison, it is required to create a set of signatures for the projects being evaluated. To
this end, we employ FLAIR technology [19], though the process is not fully automated
and is considered a time-consuming task. Certain statistics regarding the FLIRT signa-
tures generated by FLAIR are shown in Table 4.5. The number of functions in the FOSS
package corpus for which FLIRT had signatures is 457, which is approximately 14% of
the total created signatures. This low percentage can be explained by the main goal of
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FLIRT technology, which is to identify the standard library functions such as C-standard
libraries. In addition, the percentage of signature collision is 19%, which must be ﬁxed
by extending the signature formed; this further increases time consumption. Since each
of the existing systems use different metrics to measure the accuracy, we unify the metric
by using precision, recall, total accuracy (TA), and false positive rate (FPR). The obtained
accuracy results on some projects as well as ROC curve of all projects are shown in Table
4.6 and Figure 4.3, respectively.

























Figure 4.3: ROC curve
As can be seen, our system effectively identiﬁes FOSS functions in the selected
projects, and returns an average of 95% precision and 89% recall. Its accuracy is superior
to that of the other systems, including FLIRT technology, which achieves the second
highest rate of average precision 91% and 78% recall, as well as TRACY, which yields
in some projects the highest rate of precision of 82%. On the other hand, BINCLONE
achieves the lowest true positive rate since it employs exact matching, which causes a
high rate of false positives. The reason of increase in precision rate in FOSSIL could
be because of the combination types of the features (e.g., semantic and syntactic). In
addition, ranking process helps to reduce the general and irrelevant opcodes in order to
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increase the accuracy. Moreover, our system employs Bayesian network model that can
control false positives rates by deﬁning three threshold values.
An analysis of other systems reveals various limitations. TRACY is more accurate
compared with the other systems, since data ﬂow constraints are applied on tracelets
(decomposing CFGs into subtraces of ﬁxed length, excluding jump instructions). How-
ever, TRACY assumes that the candidate function should contain at least 100 basic blocks
[53]; otherwise, it has a high rate of false positives. SIGMA integrates different graph
representations, such as register ﬂow graph, control ﬂow graph, and call graph, to repre-
sent more semantics, whereas the approach is computationally expensive. The features
used by RENDEZVOUS, such as n-grams and k-CFGs, are sensitive to code changes
that lead to more false positive rates. Although grayscale images used by SARVAM are
rich sources of information, they include many irrelevant features that increase the rate of
false positives. LIBV generates execution dependence graphs (EDG) by applying data and
control ﬂow constraints; however, some issues such as having isomorphic EDGs for two
different functions affect the accuracy.
Performance. We also compare the performance of each system by computing the overall
execution time, which involves the feature extraction, and searching through the reposi-
tory to ﬁnd matches. The purpose of measuring performance is to evaluate the practicality
of each system for large-scale datasets. For this purpose, no time limit is set to ﬁnish the
FOSS function identiﬁcation. However, we notice that some approaches such as BIN-
CLONE, SIGMA, and LIBV are taking long time to detect functions since they are not
76
Table 4.6: Accuracy results of different existing approaches. (TA): total accuracy, (FPR):































































FLIRT 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.84 0.70 0.82 0.76 0.76
TRACY 0.55 0.66 0.77 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.76 0.61 0.50 0.60
SIGMA 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.82 0.76 0.62 0.48 0.58
TA BINCLONE 0.49 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.69 0.76 0.58 0.42 0.60
RENDEZVOUS 0.53 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.65 0.53 0.39 0.52
SARVAM 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.73 0.84 0.75 0.66 0.51 0.6
LIBV 0.49 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.69 0.72 0.77 0.62 0.42 0.60
FOSSIL 0.98 0.80 0.93 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.81 0.79
FLIRT 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.49 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.26 0.39
TRACY 0.35 0.51 0.36 0.22 0.48 0.51 0.35 0.52 0.25 0.46
SIGMA 0.36 0.53 0.36 0.24 0.49 0.51 0.37 0.52 0.25 0.46
BINCLONE 0.36 0.67 0.51 0.27 0.54 0.45 0.41 0.55 0.45 0.46
FPR RENDEZVOUS 0.37 0.61 0.43 0.27 0.52 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.45 0.46
SARVAM 0.39 0.53 0.35 0.20 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.21 0.48
LIBV 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.31 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.56
FOSSIL 0.15 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.39 0.38 0.18 0.39
FLIRT 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.88
TRACY 0.77 0.78 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.72 0.77 0.74
SIGMA 0.84 0.79 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.73 0.75 0.72
BINCLONE 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.84 0.77 0.81 0.87 0.69 0.55 0.74
Prec. RENDEZVOUS 0.75 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.75 0.80 0.75 0.64 0.5 0.66
SARVAM 0.85 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.87 0.76 0.79 0.73
LIBV 0.66 0.68 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.73 0.52 0.70
FOSSIL 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.90
FLIRT 0.58 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.90 0.88 0.73 0.87 0.8 0.82
TRACY 0.65 0.78 0.83 0.64 0.83 0.90 0.81 0.74 0.53 0.71
SIGMA 0.74 0.81 0.80 0.69 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.75 0.51 0.69
BINCLONE 0.60 0.81 0.77 0.66 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.73 0.50 0.70
Rec. RENDEZVOUS 0.63 0.80 0.74 0.67 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.68 0.45 0.62
SARVAM 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.67 0.83 0.91 0.81 0.78 0.50 0.71
LIBV 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.65 0.77 0.79 0.85 0.72 0.52 0.75
FOSSIL 0.99 0.84 0.94 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.82 0.85
scalable enough to obtain the search result within a speciﬁc given time frame.
In particular, the execution time for FOSS function identiﬁcation in FOSSIL was
measured by adding the time required for each step (normalization, opcode ranking, and
feature extraction in each component) to the time spent to discover the FOSS functions.
Feature extraction in the ﬁrst component takes 5 sec for the small packages in our dataset
(e.g., 100 functions ) and 15 sec for the large package (e.g., 50,000 functions). The
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proposed hash subgraph kernel is fast, taking an average of 5 sec for all packages in
a similar environment. The time required to extract features in the third component is
negligible (less than 1 ms). Our system spends the majority of time on searching the
repository; further optimizing the search using advanced indexing techniques is a future
direction. Each search iteration takes a minimum of 7 sec and a maximum of 50 sec.
The overall time for FOSSIL ranges from 17 to 80 sec, while the averages for REN-
DEZVOUS, TRACY, SARVAM, SIGMA, and LIBV are 72.5, 115, 55, 155, and 111.5 sec,
respectively. We observe that the performance of SARVAM is closer to that of FOSSIL,
since the extraction of image features is relatively efﬁcient. The performance of REN-
DEZVOUS is also close since it uses a Bloom ﬁlter, which speeds up the retrieval process.
4.4.5 Scalability Study
Since one of our ultimate goals is to build a searchable index for large-scale FOSS projects
based on the proposed approach in this chapter, in addition to time efﬁciency, we evaluate
the scalability of FOSSIL when it is used to index and retrieve matched functions on
a large number of projects. This made it possible to investigate the trade-off between
accuracy and efﬁciency. For this purpose, we add more projects, dlls, operating system
applications, and other programs to our repository. In total, there are 500 applications
and approximately 1.5 million functions. We measure the total time required to index
the project and to match the target ﬁles. In addition, we examine the accuracy of each
component separately and all together. Figure 4.4 shows that our system is scalable when
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the number of functions reaches to 1.5 million.




















































Figure 4.4: Performance of FOSSIL against a large set of functions
The F2 measure falls down slightly, from 0.9 to 0.86, which provides some insight
into the scalability of system when it deals with a large number of FOSS functions. Based
on these results, we believe our system will be efﬁcient and practical for most real-world
applications.
4.4.6 Conﬁdence Estimation of Bayesian Network
Using a Bayesian network model provides a conﬁdence estimator based on probability
scores, where higher probability scores correspond to higher conﬁdence. Future research
will hopefully produce an actual probability score. Applying different factor values to the
Bayesian network model makes it possible to achieve various trade-offs between precision
and recall. Figure 4.5 shows the results of conﬁdence estimation for three factors, varying
the trade-off between precision and recall. A precision measure of 50% is achieved with
a recall measure of just under 80%; conversely, 50% recall gives over 80% precision.
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Figure 4.5: Conﬁdence estimation: precision vs. recall
4.4.7 Impact of Evading Techniques
We consider the projects from our dataset in order to test FOSSIL against binary and
source obfuscation, as shown in Table 4.7. The obfuscation process is done in two stages.
First, C++ refactoring tools [1, 16] are used for source code level obfuscation. These rely
on the following techniques: moving a method from a superclass to its subclasses, and
extracting a few statements and placing them in a new method. We refer the reader to [67]
for in-depth explanations of these techniques. We also apply Nynaeve [21] tool, which
comprises Frame Pointer Omission and Function inlining methods. These methods are
described in 2.3.
Second, to investigate binary-level obfuscation, we compile the 160 projects with
GCC and VS compilers, and the resulting binaries are obfuscated using DaLin [87] gen-
erator and Obfuscator-LLVM [78]. These obfuscators replace instructions with other
semantically equivalent instructions (instruction substitution). Obfuscator-LLVM also
applies control ﬂow ﬂattening, and bogus control ﬂow techniques, whereas DaLin per-
forms instruction reordering, dead code insertion, and register renaming as well. The
obfuscated binaries are passed as target binaries to our system, and we then measure the
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Table 4.7: Evading technique tools, methods, and their effects on FOSSIL components




74%   
Instruction substitution 84%   




86%   
Dead code insertion 86%   
Register renaming 86%   




82%   
Jitting 83%   




86%   
Insert fake instruction 86%   
Preﬁx junk opcode 86%   
Insert junk handlers 86%   
Nynaeve [21] Frame pointer omission Src Bin 81%   Function inlining 80%   
OREANS [22] Binary encryption Src Bin NA NA NA NA
Gas Obfuscator [17] Junk byte Asm Asm 86%   
Designed Script Loop unrolling Src Src 77%   
Note: (A∗) indicates accuracy after applying obfuscation method while the accuracy before applying obfuscation method is 86%.
() indicates there is no effect, while () means the corresponding component get affected. (NA) means not applicable. We use the
following abbreviations: (Bin) Binary, (Asm) Assembly, (Src) Source, and (Dist.) Distribution.
accuracy of function identiﬁcation.
Our system obtains an average F2 measure of 83.1% in identifying similar FOSS
functions, which represents only a slight drop in comparison to the 86% observed without
obfuscation.
As can be seen in Table 4.7, the obfuscation tools work at three levels: source,
binary, and assembly. It can be observed that the obfuscation methods of CFG ﬂattening,
function inlining, and loop unrolling decrease the accuracy of FOSSIL by approximately
6 − 12%. However, their effect on accuracy is not signiﬁcant since FOSSIL employs a
Bayesian network to synthesize the knowledge obtained from the three components by
deﬁning a conﬁdence estimator function. Table 4.7 also shows that FOSSIL cannot deal
with encrypted binaries. The current version of FOSSIL consists of components relying
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on static analysis. A possibility for future work is to extend FOSSIL by including dynamic
components that can deal with encrypted binaries.
There are three main reasons for the slight drop in accuracy. The ﬁrst component,
HMM, deals with opcode frequencies at the function level, so in the case of instruction
reordering, all the reordered instructions, regardless of order, will be captured. In addi-
tion, since the operands are not considered in this component, register renaming does not
affect the accuracy. However, this component is affected slightly by instruction replace-
ment because this technique affects frequencies. However, as previously mentioned, the
chi-squared test is used to evaluate the frequencies, and it involves a conﬁdence interval
that varies according to user requirements. The second component, CFG-walk, tolerates
instruction-level obfuscation to a greater extent since it deals with the semantics of a func-
tion as well as the instruction groups. To avoid bogus control ﬂow and function inlining
techniques, we use the most important opcodes to color CFG-walks. We also label a node
with its neighbors in a novel way in order to avoid any obfuscation that can affect the CFG.
However, this component is affected by CFG ﬂattening. The third component, z-score,
measures the area of the opcode distribution, so both instruction replacement and dead
code insertion may slightly affect it. In general, using opcode ranking, normalization,
and coloring techniques reduce the effects of most aforementioned obfuscation methods.
However, the Bayesian network model synthesizes the knowledge obtained from the three
components; therefore, if the knowledge from one is not sufﬁcient, the Bayesian network
model will automatically assign more weight to the other components.
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The Impact of Compilers. To create an experimental dataset, we consider 160 projects
compiled with Visual Studio (VS), GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), Intel C++ Compiler
(ICC), and Clang compilers with Od optimization setting. To measure the effect of dif-
ferent compilation options such as compiler optimization ﬂags, we additionally compile
them with level-1, level-2, and level-3 optimizations, namely the O0, O2, and Ox ﬂags.
We extract features for each compilation setting, and then test our system. The results
illustrated in Table 4.8 show that the features extracted by our system are greatly effective
for most optimization speed levels.
Table 4.8: FOSS function identiﬁcation with different compilers and compilation settings
Compiler Optimization Speed Precision Recall
VS O0, O2, Ox 0.95, 0.95, 0.95 0.94, 0.92, 0.92
GCC O0, O2, Ox 0.92, 0.92, 0.92 0.93, 0.90, 0.89
ICC O0, O2, Ox 0.78, 0.74, 0.69 0.81, 0.80, 0.78
Clang O0, O2, Ox 0.65, 0.59, 0.60 0.64, 0.60, 0.58
The normalization process used in our system can reduce the effect of GCC and
VS compilers. Moreover, the top-ranked opcodes are more related to the semantics of
the function, in addition to the colored CFG-walks which help to avoid compiler effects.
However, the accuracy drops signiﬁcantly when the source compilers are Clang or ICC,
since these compilers produce more optimized code compared to VS and GCC compilers.
Such limitations can be handled by ﬁrst identifying the compiler using existing tools such
as Exeinfo [3] and then applying the suitable features accordingly.
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4.5 Summary
To conclude, we have conducted the ﬁrst investigation in identifying FOSS functions. we
proposed a novel resilient and efﬁcient system that incorporates three components. The
ﬁrst component extracts the syntactical features of functions by considering opcode fre-
quencies and applying a hidden Markov model statistical test. The second component
applies a neighborhood hash graph kernel to random walks derived from control ﬂow
graphs, with the goal of extracting the semantics of the functions. The third component
applies z-score to the normalized instructions to extract the behavior of instructions in a
function. The components are integrated using a Bayesian network model which synthe-
sizes the results to determine the FOSS function. Our evaluation demonstrates that our
proposed system yields highly accurate results.
84
Chapter 5
Identifying the Authors of Program
Binaries
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present BinAuthor, a system that extracts authors’ coding habits from
binary code. To capture coding habits, BinAuthor leverages a set of features that are based
on collections of functionality-independent choices made by authors during coding. Our
evaluation shows that BinAuthor outperforms existing methods in several aspects. First,
it successfully attributes a larger number of authors with a signiﬁcantly higher accuracy
when compared to existing research contributions. Second, BinAuthor is more robust than
previous methods in the sense that there is no signiﬁcant drop in accuracy when the code
is subjected to refactoring techniques, code transformation, and different compilers.
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5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we ﬁrst provide an overview of the main idea and then introduce the threat
model.
5.2.1 Authorship Attribution
The feasibility of authorship attribution generally relies on the fact that software develop-
ers usually possess certain coding habits, which may be inﬂuenced by their education and
training, experiences, development environments, etc. For example, a programmer com-
ing from a procedural programming background may be more reluctant to take advantage
of object-oriented modularization than person who starts to learn programming with an
object-oriented language. Although one coding habit is usually not enough to uniquely
identify an author, a collection of such habits may be sufﬁcient. However, there are two
key challenges in recognizing such coding habits from a binary. First, how to ensure that
the extracted features represent coding habits instead of something dominated by the pro-
gram’s functionality? Second, which coding habits are preserved in the binaries after the
compilation process?
To address the ﬁrst issue, our main idea is twofold: First, we rely on coding habits
that can be represented as functionality-independent choices; for instance, the same func-
tionality could be implemented by either in a procedural programming or object-oriented
styles, with either more global variables or more local variables, with more while loops
or more for loops, etc. Second, in addition to relying on functionality-independent
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choices, we also ensure that these choices are habitual enough for each author, by only
considering those that frequently appear across various program binaries performing dif-
ferent tasks written by that author. As a result, only those functionality-independent
choices that are also persistent for each author regardless of varying functionality will
be considered as candidate features. To address the second issue, we investigate a large
collection of source code together with their mapping to assembly instructions to deter-
mine which candidate features are preserved in the binaries. In Section 5.3, we show how
BinAuthor captures such coding choices using a rich list of features.
5.2.2 Threat Model
BinAuthor is a system speciﬁcally designed to assist reverse engineers in discovering in-
formation from a binary that may be related to its author(s). As such, it is not intended
for general purpose reverse engineering tasks, such as unpacking or deobfuscating mal-
ware samples. We investigate refactoring and code transformations later in this Chapter in
order to demonstrate possible evading countermeasures that may be used by future mal-
ware authors in order to circumvent detection. More speciﬁcally, the threat model of this
chapter is further clariﬁed in what follows.
Since the research on binary authorship attribution is still in its infancy, BinAuthor
is certainly not meant as a bullet-proof solution. As such, strengthening it against possi-
ble countermeasures will be an ongoing and continuous battle. Nonetheless, we dedicated
special care to evading techniques while designing and implementing BinAuthor. We have
87
taken into consideration some potential evading techniques. First, we assume that the ad-
versaries might apply refactoring techniques to evade detection. Second, the adversaries
might apply code transformations to source and binary ﬁles. Third, since a program bi-
nary can be signiﬁcantly changed by simply choosing a different compiler or by altering
the compilation settings. Finally, the adversaries may intentionally avoid or fake some of
their coding habits (however, it is known to be hard for a programmer to avoid all coding
habits or use a different style for each program, and in fact, faking a style may even help
detection in some cases [91]).
We show how BinAuthor survives the ﬁrst three aforementioned threats in Sec-
tion 5.4. As for the last threat, the features of BinAuthor have been carefully designed to
capture coding habits at multiple abstraction levels, which makes it harder for adversaries
to evade detection even if they are aware of the habits being looked for [91]. In addition,
an operational solution is to customize and enrich the list of features based on the actual
use case and learning data, which will both improve accuracy and make it more difﬁcult
for adversaries to hide all their habits.
5.3 BinAuthor
Our goal is to automatically identify the author(s) of binary code. We approach this
problem using different distance metrics; that is, we generate a list of functionality-
independent choices from training data of sample binaries with known authors. Hence, we
propose a system encompassing different components, each of which is meant to achieve
88
a particular purpose. The ﬁrst component, (Filtration), isolates user functions from com-
piler functions and library functions. Hence, the outcome of this component is consid-
ered as a habit (e.g., the preference in using speciﬁc compiler or free software packages
). For instance, using GCC compiler rather than visual studio, or using SQLite
rather MongoDB, etc. The second component, (Feature Categorization), analyzes binary
code to extract possible features that represent stylistic choices. The third component,
(Author Habits Proﬁling), constructs a repository of habits of known authors. The last
component (Authorship Attribution) performs matching to BinAuthor’s repository for au-
thor classiﬁcation attribution. Figure 5.1 illustrates the architecture of BinAuthor. The
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Figure 5.1: BinAuthor architecture
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5.3.1 Filtration Process
An important initial step in most reverse engineering tasks is to distinguish between user
functions and library/compiler functions. This step saves considerable time and helps shift
the focus to more relevant functions. The ﬁltration process consists of three steps. First,
FLIRT [6] (Fast Library Identiﬁcation and Recognition Technology) technology is used to
label library functions. Second, a set of signatures is created for speciﬁc FOSS libraries
such as Sqlite3, libpng, zlib, and openssl using Fast Library Acquisition for
Identiﬁcation and Recognition (FLAIR) [6]; this set is added to the existing signatures of
the IDA FLIRT list. The last step performs compiler functions ﬁltration, the details of
which are explained below. Also, we employ our proposed work in Chapter 3 to identify
reused functions. Further, we use FOSSIL, our proposed work in Chapter 4, in order to
identify FOSS-related functions.
The idea is based on the hypothesis that compiler/helper functions can be identiﬁed
through a collection of static signatures that are created in the training phase (e.g. opcode
frequencies). We analyze a number of programs with different functionality, ranging from
a simple “Hello World!" program to programs fulﬁlling complex tasks. Through the in-
tersection of these functions combined with manual analysis, we collect 120 functions as
compiler/helper functions. The opcode frequencies are extracted from these functions,
after which the mean and variance of each opcode among all opcodes are calculated. In
other words, each disassembled program P, after passing FLIRT, consists of n functions
{f1, · · ·, fn}. Each function fk is represented as m pairs of opcodes oi, where m is the
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number of distinct opcodes in function fk. Each opcode oi ∈ O has a pair of values (μi,
νi), which represents the mean and variance values of that speciﬁc opcode. Each opcode
in the target function is measured against the same opcode of all compiler functions in
the training set. If the measured distance Di,j is less than a predeﬁned threshold value
α = 0.005, the opcode is considered as a match. A function is labeled as compiler-related
if the matched opcodes ratio is greater than a predeﬁned threshold value learned from
experiments to be γ = 0.75; otherwise, the target function is labeled as user-related.








where (μj , νj) represents the opcode mean and variance, respectively, of the target func-
tion. This similarity detects functions, which are closer to each other in terms of types
of opcodes. For instance, logical opcodes are not available in compiler-related functions.
Finally, a score is given to every distance that is below a predeﬁned threshold α. A func-
tion is tagged as a compiler-related function if the ratio of summation of scores to the
number of unique opcodes is beyond a given threshold γ; otherwise, the target function is
deemed a user-related function.
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5.3.2 Feature Categorization
Determining a set of characteristics that remain constant for a signiﬁcant portion of pro-
grams, written by an author, is analogous to ﬁnding human characteristics that can later
be used for the identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc person. To this end, our aim is to automate the
ﬁnding of such program characteristics, and with reasonable computational cost. To cap-
ture coding habits at different abstraction levels, we consider a spectrum of such habits, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2. As shown in Figure 5.2, an author’s habits can be reﬂected in the
preference of choosing certain keywords or compilers, the reliance on the main function,
or the use of an object oriented programming paradigm. In addition, the manner in which
the code is organized by the author may also reﬂect author habits. All possible choices
are stored as a template in this step. Moreover, we introduce a novel taxonomy of coding
habits in Figure 5.2. We provide details of each category of functionality-independent
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Figure 5.2: Coding habit taxonomy
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A. General Choices
General choices are designed to capture the author’s general programming preferences;
for example, preferences in organizing the code, terminating a function, use of particular
keywords, or use of speciﬁc resources.
1) Code Organization: We capture how code is organized by measuring the re-
liance on the main function since it is considered a starting part for managing user func-
tions. We deﬁne a set of ratios, as shown in Table 5.1, that measures the actions used in
the main function. We thus capture the percentage of usage of keywords, local variables,
API calls, and calling user functions, as well as the ratio between the number of basic
blocks of the main function to the number of basic blocks of other user functions. These
percentages are computed in relation to the length of the main function, where the length
signiﬁes the number of instructions in the function. The results are represented as a vector
of ratio values, which is used by the detection component.
Table 5.1: Features extracted from the main function: length(l): Number of instructions
in the main function
Ratio Equation Description
# of push / l Ratio of local variables to length
# of push / # of lea Ratio of local variables to memory address locations
# of lea / l Ratio of memory address locations to length
# of calls / l Ratio of function calls to length
# of indirect calls / l Ratio of API calls to length
# of BBs / total # of all BBs Ratio of the number of basic blocks of the main function to that of other
user functions
# of calls / # of user functions Ratio of function calls to the number of user functions
2) Function Termination: BinAuthor captures how an author terminates a func-
tion. This could help identify an author since programmers may be used to speciﬁc ways
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of terminating a function. BinAuthor does not only consider the last statement of a func-
tion as the terminating instruction; rather, it considers the last basic block of the function
with its predecessor as the terminating part. This is a realistic consideration since var-
ious actions may be required before a function terminates. To this end, BinAuthor not
only considers the usual terminating instructions, such as return and exit, but also
captures other related actions that are taken prior to termination. For instance, a function
may be terminated with a display of messages, calling another function, releasing some
resources, communication over networks, etc. Table 5.2 shows examples of what is cap-
tured in relation to the termination of a function. Each feature is set to 1 if it is used to
terminate a function; otherwise, it is set to 0. The output of this component is a binary
vector that is used by the detection component.
Table 5.2: Examples of actions in terminating a function
Features
Printing results to memory Printing results to ﬁle
Using system ("pause") User action such as cin
Calling user functions Calling API functions
Closing ﬁles Closing resources
Freeing memory Flushing buffer
Using network communication Printing clock time
Releasing semaphores or locks Printing errors
3) Keyword and resource preferences: BinAuthor captures the author’s prefer-
ence of using different keywords or resources. We only consider groups of such prefer-
ences with equivalent or similar functionality in order to avoid functionality-dependent
features. For instance, keyword type preferences for inputs (e.g., using cin, scanf),
preferences of using particular resources or a speciﬁc compiler (we identify the compiler
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through tracking strings called compiler tags [108]), and the manner in which certain
keywords are used can serve as further indications of an author’s habits.
General Choice Computation: We compute a set of vectors, vgi, ( where g represents
general and i represents the sub-category number). To consider the reliance on the main
function, a vector vg1, representing related features, is constructed according to the equa-
tions shown in Table 5.1. These equations indicate the author’s reliance on the main
function as well as the actions performed by the author. Function termination is repre-
sented as a binary vector, (vg2), which is determined by the absence or existence of a
set of features for function termination. Keyword and resource preferences are identiﬁed
through binary string matching, which tracks the annotations to call and mov instruc-
tions. For instance, excessive use of fflush will cause the string "_imp_fflush" to
appear frequently in the resulting binary. We extract a collection of strings from all user
functions of a particular author, then intersect these strings in order to derive a persistent
vector (vg3) for that author. Consequently, for each author, a set of vectors representing the
author’s signature is stored in our repository. Given a target binary, BinAuthor constructs
the vectors from the target and measures the distance/similarity between these vectors and
those in our repository. The vg1 vector is compared using Euclidean distance, whereas vg2
vector is compared using the Jaccard distance. For vg3, the similarity is computed through
string matching. Finally, the three derived similarity values are averaged in order to obtain
λg, which is later used in Section 5.3.3 for the purpose of author classiﬁcation.
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B. Variable Choices
Developers often have their own habits for deﬁning local and global variables, which may
originate from the author’s experiences or skills. The variable chain has been shown to
greatly improve author attribution of source code [59]. It has been deﬁned as the variable
usage among different functions. Inspired by this work, we introduce a register chain
to capture authors’ habits in using variables. We deﬁne the register chain concept as
the states of using a particular register through all basic blocks in a user function. To
avoid compilation setting effects, we normalize the registers to general names such as
Reg1, Reg2, etc. and keep their occurrence order. Useful characteristics of such chains
include the longest chain, the shortest chain, the number of existing chains, the liveness
of registers among basic blocks, etc.
Example: In what follows, we illustrate how a register chain is extracted. Part of the
Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the RC4 function in Citadel is shown in Figure 5.3(a).
Figure 5.3(b) shows the construction of the register liveness [100] for the indicated regis-
ters.
As illustrated in Figure 5.3(b), the used registers ecx, ebp, esi, ebx, edx, and
al are normalized to Reg1, · · · , Reg6. The ﬁrst, second, and third basic blocks manipu-
late 〈Reg1, Reg2〉, 〈Reg3, Reg4〉, and 〈Reg2, Reg5, Reg6〉 registers, respectively. BinAu-
thor captures the register liveness by storing the set of basic blocks where the register is
alive. For instance, the Reg2 register appears in the ﬁrst and third basic blocks and does
not appear in the second basic block, so we represent the liveness of the Reg2 register as
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inc   ecx
mov   [ebp+a], ecx
cmp   ecx, [ebp+b]      
pop esi
pop ebx
mov  al, [ebp+0x4]
mov  [edx+100], al
mov  al, [ebp+y]
mov  [edx+101], a1
mov  al, [ebp+var]

































Figure 5.3: (a) Part of the CFG of RC4 (b) Register chain
{BB1, BB3}. A summary of the registers liveness is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Register liveness (indicates that the register is alive in a BB)
Register BB1 BB2 BB3
Reg1  - -
Reg2  - 
Reg3 -  -
Reg4 -  -
Reg5 - - 
Reg6 - - 
Variable Choice Computation: Since each function may have a large number of register
chains, BinAuthor employs locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) for feature reduction. The
hash is calculated over all sets of chains, and only those with similar hash values are
clustered (hashed) to the same bucket. In the case of register chain similarity, similar
register chains will be hashed to the same bucket. Once register chains have been hashed
to a corresponding bucket, any bucket containing more than one similar hash value is
identiﬁed and a list of candidate register chains is extracted. Finally, similarity analysis
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is performed to rank the candidate pairs obtained from the previous steps. The similarity
score obtained from this choice is λv.
C. Quality-Related Choices
We investigate code quality in terms of standard compliance with C/C++ coding standards
and security concerns. In the literature, code quality can be measured with different indi-
cators, such as testability, ﬂexibility, adaptability [109], etc. BinAuthor deﬁnes rules for
capturing code that exhibits either relatively high or low quality. For any code that cannot
be matched using such rules, the code is labeled as regular quality, which indicates that
the code quality feature is not applicable.
Rules: Examples of low-quality coding styles include reopening already opened ﬁles,
leaving ﬁles open when they are no longer in use, attempting to modify constants (i.e.,
through pointers), using ﬂoat variables as loop counters, and declaring variables inside
of a switch statement, which can result in unexpected/undeﬁned behavior due to jumped-
over instructions. Examples of high-quality coding styles include handling errors gener-
ated by library calls (i.e., examining the returned value by fclose()), avoiding reliance
on side-effects (i.e., ++ operator) within particular calls such as sizeof or _Alignof,
averting the use of particular calls on some environments or using them with protective
measures (i.e., the use of system() in Linux may lead to shell command injection or
privilege escalation; hence, using execve() instead is indicative of high-quality cod-
ing), and the use of locks and semaphores around critical sections.
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Quality-related Choice Computation: We build a set of idiom templates to describe
high or low quality habits. Idioms are sequences of instructions with wild-card possibility
[82]. We employ the idioms templates in [82] according to our qualitative-related choice.
In addition, such templates carry a meaningful connection to the quality-related choices.
Our experiments demonstrate that such idiom templates may effectively capture quality-
related habits. BinAuthor uses the Levenshtein distance [131] for this computation due
to its efﬁciency. The similarity is represented by λq, which is used in Section 5.3.3 for
author classiﬁcation purpose.
λq = 1− L(Ci, Cj)
max(|Ci|, |Cj|)
where L(Ci, Cj) is the Levenshtein distance between the qualitative-related choices Ci
(sequence of instructions) and Cj , max(|Ci|, |Cj|) returns the maximum length between
two choices Ci and Cj in terms of characters.
D. Embedded Choices
We deﬁne embedded choices by actions that are related to coding habits present in the
source code that are not easily captured at the binary level by traditional features such as
strings or graphs. For instance, initializing member variables in constructors and dynami-
cally deleting allocated resources in destructors are examples of embedded choices. As it
is not feasible to list all possible features, BinAuthor relies on the fact that opcodes reveal
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actions, expertise, habits, knowledge, and other author characteristics, and analyzes the
distribution of opcode frequencies. Our experiments show that such a distribution can
effectively capture the manner by which the author manages the code. As every single
action in source code can affect the frequency of opcodes, BinAuthor targets embedded
choices by capturing the distribution of opcode frequencies.
Example: In order to pass parameters to a function, a developer may choose to pass
primitive types by value or to pass objects by reference, and may have preferences in
using one particular algorithm over another. Such examples are not straightforward to
be captured through tracking strings or CFGs. We observe through our experiments that
embedded choices may share similar opcode distributions.
Embedded Choice Computation: For measuring the distance between distributions of
opcode frequencies, the Mahalanobis distance [90] is used to measure the similarity of
opcode distributions among different user functions. The Mahalanobis distance is chosen
because it can capture the correlation between opcode frequency distributions, and this
correlation represents the embedded choices. The similarity returned is represented by
λe.
E. Structural Choices
Programmers usually develop their own habits in terms of structural design of an ap-
plication. They may prefer to use a fully object-oriented design or they may be more
accustomed to procedural programming. Such structural choices can serve as features for
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author identiﬁcation. To avoid functionality, we consider the common subgraphs and the
longest path for each user function, and then intersect them among different user func-
tions. These subgraphs are deﬁned as k-graphs, where k is the number of nodes. These
common k-graphs form author signatures since these graphs always appear regardless of
the program functionality. In addition, we consider the longest path since it reﬂects how
an author tends to use deep or nested loops.
Example: An author may organize different classes in an ad hoc manner, or organize
them in a hierarchical way by designing a driver class to contain several manager classes,
where each manager is responsible for different processes (a collection of threads running
in parallel). Both ad hoc and hierarchical organizations will create a common structure in
the author’s programs.
Structural Choice Computation: BinAuthor uses subgraphs of size k in order to cap-
ture structural choices (k = 4, 5, and 6 through our experiments). Given a k-graph, the
graph is transformed into strings using Bliss open-source toolkit [79]. Then, a similarity
measurement is performed over these strings using the normalized compression distance
(NCD) [48], which enhances search performance. We have chosen NCD since it allows us
to concatenate all the common subgraphs that appear in author’s programs. Additionally,
it allows for inexact matching between the target subgraphs and the training subgraphs.
BinAuthor forms a signature based on these strings. The similarity obtained from this
choice is represented by λs.
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5.3.3 Signiﬁcance of BinAuthor Choices
As previously described, BinAuthor extracts different types of choices to characterize
different aspects of author coding habits. Such choices do not equally contribute to the at-
tribution process since the signiﬁcance of these indicators are not identical. Consequently,
a weight is assigned to each choice by applying logistic regression to each choice individ-
ually in order to predict class probabilities (e.g., the probability of identifying an author).
The probability outcomes of logistic regression prediction is illustrated in Table 5.4. We





where ps is the smallest probability value (e.g. 0.32 in Table 5.4), pi is the probability out-
come from logistic regression of each choice, and the rnd function rounds the normalized
values (pi/ps), leading us to the weights shown in Table 5.4.










The described stylistic choices are implemented using separate Python scripts for mod-
ularity purposes, which altogether form our analytical system. A subset of the python
scripts in the BinAuthor system is used in tandem with IDA Pro disassembler. The ﬁnal set
of the framework scripts performs the bulk of the choice analysis functions that compute
and display critical information about an author’s coding style. With the analysis frame-
work completed, a graph database is utilized to perform complex graph operations such
as k-graph extraction. The graph database chosen for this task is Neo4j [15]. Gephi [12]
is employed for all graph analysis functions, which are not provided by Neo4j. MongoDB
database is used to store our features for efﬁciency and scalability purposes.
5.4.2 Dataset
The used dataset is consisted of several applications from different sources, as described
below: (i) GitHub [7], where a considerable amount of real open-source projects are
available; (ii) Google Code Jam [5], an international programming competition, where
solutions to difﬁcult algorithmic puzzles are available; (iii) Planet Source Code [14], a
web-based service that offers a large amount of source code written in different program-
ming languages; (iv) Graduate Student Projects at our institution. Statistics about the
dataset are provided in Table 5.5. In total, we test 152 authors from different sets in which
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each author has two to ten software applications.
Table 5.5: Statistics about the dataset used in the evaluation of BinAuthor
Source # of authors # of programs # of functions average # of code lines # of ﬁles
GitHub 5 10 40000 5000 754
Google Code Jam 50 250 10050 80 250
Planet Source Code 44 168 11650 250 400
Graduate Student Projects 25 125 9609 250 450
5.4.3 Dataset Compilation
We compile the source code with different compilers and compilation settings to measure
the effects of such variations. We use GNU Compiler Collection’s gcc or g++ with dif-
ferent optimization levels, as well as Microsoft Visual Studio (VS) 2010. We study the
impact of Clang and ICC compilers, as described in Section 5.4.8.
5.4.4 Author Classiﬁcation
After extracting features, we deﬁne a probability value P(A) based on obtained weights as
described in Section 5.3.3. Further, a decision function ascribes an authorID to any new







where wi represents the weight assigned to each choice, as shown in Table 5.4, and λi is
the distance metric value obtained from each choice (λg, λv, λq, λe, and λs). If P(A)≥ ζ ,
where ζ represents predeﬁned threshold values, it is labeled as a matched author. Through
our experiments, we ﬁnd that the best value of ζ is 0.87.
5.4.5 Accuracy
The main purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the accuracy of author identiﬁcation
in binaries.
Evaluation Settings: The evaluation of BinAuthor system is conducted using the datasets
described in Section 5.4.2. The data is randomly split into 10 sets, where one set is
reserved as a testing set, and the remaining sets are used as training sets to evaluate the
system. To evaluate BinAuthor and to compare it with existing methods, precision (P)
and recall (R) measures are applied. We choose F0.5 because BinAuthor is much more
sensitive to false positives than false negatives. Therefore, precision is of higher priority
than recall. We employ an F-measure as follows:
F 0.5 = 1.25 .
P . R
0.25P +R
Results Comparison. We compare BinAuthor with the existing authorship attribution
methods [27, 43, 112]. We evaluate the authorship classiﬁcation technique presented by
Rosenblum et al. [112], whose source code is available at [9], although the dataset is not
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available. The source code of the proposed technique by Caliskan-Islam et al. [43] is
available at [13]. For our previous system (OBA2) [27], we have the source code as well
as the dataset. Caliskan-Islam et al. present the largest scale evaluation of binary author-
ship attribution in related work, which contains 600 authors with 8 training programs per
author. Rosenblum et al. present a large-scale evaluation of 190 authors with at least 8
training programs, while Alrabaee et al. present a small scale evaluation of 5 authors with
10 programs for each. As the datasets are not available, we compare our results with these
methods by using the datasets mentioned in Table 5.5. The system of Caliskan-Islam et
al. uses 4500 features; Rosenblum et al. use 10000 features; Alrabaee et al. use 6500
features; and our system uses 2200 features.
Figure 5.4 details the results of comparing the accuracy between BinAuthor and
all other existing methods. It shows the relationship between the accuracy (F0.5) and the
number of authors present in all datasets, where the accuracy decreases as the size of
author population increases. The results show that BinAuthor achieves better accuracy
in determining the author of binaries. Taking all four approaches into consideration, the
highest accuracy of authorship attribution is close to 96% on the Google Code Jam with
less than 50 authors, while the lowest accuracy is 22% when 150 authors are involved on
all dataset together. We believe that the reason behind Caliskan-Islam et al. approach su-
periority on Google Jam Code is that this dataset is simple and can be easily decompiled
to source code. BinAuthor also identiﬁes the author of Github dataset with an accuracy
of 90%. The main reason for this is due to the fact that the authors of projects in Github
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Figure 5.4: Accuracy results of authorship attribution obtained by BinAuthor, Caliskan-
Islam et al. [43], Rosenblum et al. [112], and OBA2 [27], on (a) Github, (b) Google Code
Jam, (c) Planet Source Code, (d) Graduate Student Projects, and (e) All datasets.
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have no restrictions when developing projects. In addition, the advanced programmers
of such projects usually design their own class or template to be used in the projects.
The lower accuracy obtained by BinAuthor is approximately 75% on a Graduate student
projects with 25 authors. This is explained by the fact that programs in Graduate student
projects have common choices among different students due to assignment rules, which
force students to change/restrict their habits accordingly. When the number of authors is
140 on the mixed dataset, the accuracy of Rosenblum et al., Caliskan-Islam et al., and
OBA2 approaches drop rapidly to 30% on all datasets, whereas our system’s accuracy
remains greater than 75%. This provides evidence for the stability of using coding habits
in identifying authors. In total, the different categories of choices achieve an average ac-
curacy of 84% for ten distinct authors and 75% when discriminating among 152 authors.
These results show that author habits may survive the compilation process.
5.4.6 False Positives
We investigate the false positives in order to understand the situations where BinAuthor
is likely to make incorrect attribution decisions. Figure 5.5 shows the false positives
relationship with the number of authors in repository. For this experiment, we consider 4
programs for each author. For instance, when we have 50 authors (4*50 = 200 programs),
BinAuthor misclassiﬁes 16 programs. Also, when the number of authors is 1100 (1100*4
= 4400 programs), the number of false positives is 402. These false positives (402) are
investigated in Figure 5.5 (a). Also, we show the false positives in each dataset as shown
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in Figure 5.5 (b). It is obviously shown that the false positives rate for student dataset is
the highest rate and we believe the reason behind this is that each student should follow
the standard coding instructions that restrict him/her to have their habits.








































Figure 5.5: False positive analysis.
5.4.7 Scalability
Security analysts or reverse engineers may be interested in performing large-scale author
identiﬁcation, and in the case of malware, an analyst may have to deal with a large number
of new samples on a daily basis. With this in mind, we evaluate how well BinAuthor
scales. To prepare a large dataset for the purpose of large-scale authorship attribution,
we obtained programs from three sources: Google Code Jam, GitHub, and Planet Source
Code. We eliminated from the experiment programs that could not be compiled because
they contain bugs and those written by authors who contributed only one or two programs.
The resulting dataset comprised 103,800 programs by 23,000 authors: 60% from Google
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Code Jam, 25% from Planet source code, and 15% from GitHub. We modiﬁed the script1
used in [43] to download all the code submitted to the Google Code Jam competition.
The programs from the other two sources were downloaded manually. The programs were
compiled with the Visual Studio and gcc compilers, using the same settings as those in
our previous investigations. The experiment evaluated how well the top-weighted choices
represent author habits. The results of the large-scale author identiﬁcation are shown in
Figure 5.6.















Figure 5.6: Large-scale author attribution
The ﬁgure shows the precision with which BinAuthor identiﬁes the author, and its
scaling behavior as the number of authors increases is satisfactory . An author is identiﬁed
among almost 4000 authors with 72% precision. When the number of authors is doubled
to 8000, the precision is close to 65%, and it remains nearly constant (49%) after the
number of authors reaches 19, 000. Additionally, we tested BinAuthor on the programs
from each of the sources. We found high precision (88%) for samples from the GitHub
dataset, 82% precision for samples from the Planet dataset, and low precision (51%) for
samples from Google code jam. After analyzing these results, we ﬁnd that the authors
1https://github.com/calaylin/CodeStylometry/tree/master/Corpus
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who wrote the code for difﬁcult tasks is easier to attribute than easier tasks.













Embedded General Quality Variable Structural
Figure 5.7: Effect of choices on large-scale author identiﬁcation
We studied the impact of each choice on precision (Figure 5.7). For example, when
the number of authors is 15,000, BinAuthor achieves a precision of 70% based on the
use of variables, while with structural considerations, it achieves a precision of 50%, the
lowest for all the choices. When the number of authors reaches 21,000, the precision for
embedded, general, quality, variable, and structural choices is 56%, 45%, 49%, 60%, and
40%, respectively. From Figure 5.6, it seems reasonable to expect that when the number
of authors exceeds 20,000, there will be little additional change in the precision.
5.4.8 Impact of Evading Techniques
Refactoring Techniques. We consider a random set of 50 ﬁles from our dataset which we
use for the C++ refactoring process [1, 16]. We consider the techniques described in 2.3.
We obtain an accuracy of 83.5% in correctly classifying authors, which is only a mild drop
in comparison to the 85% accuracy observed without applying refactoring techniques.
Based on the above results, BinAuthor can tolerate refactoring techniques, as some of
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Table 5.6: Evading techniques: methods used, tools used, and their affect on BinAuthor
choices.



























85 −→ 84     
MM 86 −→ 82     




86 −→ 83     
Instruction substitu-
tion
86 −→ 80     




86 −→ 86     
Dead code insertion 86 −→ 86     
Register renaming 86 −→ 86     
Instruction replace-
ment




86 −→ 20     
Jitting 86 −→ 0     




86 −→ 85     
Insert fake instruction 86 −→ 86     
Preﬁx junk opcode 86 −→ 86     
Insert junk handlers 86 −→ 86     
Nynaeve [21] Frame Pointer Omis-sion Source Binary
86 −→ 83     
Function inlining 86 −→ 78     
OREANS [22] Encrypt binary Source Binary NA NA NA NA NA NA
Gas Obfuscator [17] Junk byte Assembly Assembly 86 −→ 86     
Designed Script Loop unrolling Source Source 86 −→ 75     
Note: (A) means the accuracy before applying obfuscation method while (A∗) means the accuracy after applying it. () means there
is no effect while () means there is an effect. (NA) means is not applicable.
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these techniques change the syntax of the code but do not change its semantics. The
accuracy remains the same when the RV technique is applied, whereas the accuracy drops
slightly when MM and NM are applied. Since some of the choices used in BinAuthor
(general and embedded choices) are based on semantic features, they are not signiﬁcantly
affected by these techniques. However, qualitative choices are more affected since these
choices rely on speciﬁc patterns captured/represented by idioms.
Impact of Obfuscation. We are interested in determining how BinAuthor handles simple
binary obfuscation techniques intended for evading detection, as implemented by tools
such as Obfuscator-LLVM [78]. These obfuscators replace instructions by other seman-
tically equivalent instructions, introduce spurious control ﬂow, and can even completely
ﬂatten control ﬂow graphs. For this experiment, we consider a set of 50 authors from our
dataset, all of whom have ﬁve binary samples. Obfuscation techniques implemented by
Obfuscator-LLVM are applied to the samples prior to classifying the authors. We proceed
to extract functionality-independent choices from obfuscated samples. Using principle
component analysis to select the best features, we obtain an accuracy of 82.9% in cor-
rectly classifying authors, which is only a slight drop in comparison to the 85% accuracy
observed without obfuscation. We combine the refactoring process with the above obfus-
cation by ﬁrst applying the refactoring techniques on the selected dataset (50 authors) at
the source level, after which they are compiled using Visual Studio 2010. After applying
obfuscation techniques, the accuracy dropped from 85% to 80.4%. Table 5.6 shows the
details about which tool has been used and which methods are applied. In addition, we
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show which choice in BinAuthor is affected.
The Impact of Compilers. To create experimental datasets for this purpose, we consider
1000 authors with ﬁve training programs for each. We ﬁrst compile the source code with
gcc, VS, ICC, and Clang compilers. Next, to measure the effect of different compilation
options such as compiler optimization ﬂags, we additionally compile the source code with
level-1, level-2, and level-3 optimizations, namely the Od, O2, and Ox ﬂags. The results
show that for most optimization speed levels coding habits are preserved to a great extent.
However, the accuracy drops signiﬁcantly more (from 86% to 43%) when the Clang or
ICC compilers are used compared to the slight drop in accuracy (from 86% to 83%) when
the VS and gcc compilers are used, as the former compilers produce more variable code.
5.5 Applying BinAuthor to Malware Binaries
One challenge in applying BinAuthor to real world malware is the lack of ground truth
concerning the attribution of authorship due to the nature of malware. Also, whether a
malware package is created by an individual or an organization is generally unconﬁrmed.
Those limitations partially explain the fact that few research efforts have been seen on
this subject. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, BinAuthor is the ﬁrst attempt to ap-
ply automated authorship attribution to real malware. Fortunately, we can correlate the
results of our automated approach to those obtained through manual analysis by domain
experts, e.g., in [91], a manual investigation is conducted to establish relationships among
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the authors of a few samples of malware. We have applied BinAuthor to a set that com-
prises three pairs, each suspected of having common authorship: Bunny and Babar;
Stuxnet and Flame; and Zeus and Citadel. In [10, 85, 91], it is found that each of
the pairs in the dataset is likely to have originated from the same set of authors. Table 5.7
describes the characteristics of the ﬁrst malware dataset.
Table 5.7: Characteristics of malware datasets
Malware Packed Obfuscated Source code Binary code Type # of functions Source of sample
Zeus     PE 557 Contagio [2]
Citadel     PE 794 Contagio [2]
Flame     ELF 1434 Contagio [2]
Stuxnet     ELF 2154 Contagio [2]
Bunny     PE 854 VirusSign [4]
Babar     PE 1025 VirusSign [4]
We describe the application of BinAuthor to some well-known malware binaries.
Given a set of functions, BinAuthor clusters them based on the number of common
choices. The existence of three or more shared choices is an indication that the func-
tions are likely to have a single author. Sharing only one or two choices suggests multiple
authors due to the lack of stylistic consistency.
Table 5.8: Statistics of applying BinAuthor to malware binaries













































Bunny and Babar 372 494 127 450 278 290 150 478 340
Stuxnet and Flame 725 528 189 300 0 689 515 294 180
Zeus and Citadel 655 452 289 370 0 600 588 194 258
115
5.5.1 Applying BinAuthor to Bunny and Babar
Findings. We apply BinAuthor to binaries and cluster the functions based on functionality
independent choices. BinAuthor is able to ﬁnd the following coding habits automatically:
the use of all capital letters for conﬁg in XML and the preference for using Visual Studio
2008 (general choices); the use of one variable over a long chain (variable choice); the
choice of methods for accessing freed memory, dynamically deallocating allocated re-
sources, and reopening resources more than once in the same function (quality choices);
and the use of a common approach to managing functions (structural choices).
Statistics. As shown in Table 5.8, BinAuthor found functions common to Bunny and
Babar that share the aforementioned coding habits: 494 functions share qualitative
choices; 450 functions share embedded choices; 372 functions share general choices;
278 functions share variable choices; and 127 functions share structural choices. Among
these, BinAuthor found 340 functions that share 4 choices, 478 functions that share 3
choices, 150 functions that share 2 choices, and 290 functions that share 1 choice.
Summary. Considering the 854 and 1025 functions in Bunny and Babar, respectively,
BinAuthor found that 44% ((340 + 478) / (854 + 1025)) are likely to have been written by
a single author, and 23% are likely to have been written by multiple authors. No common
choices were identiﬁed in the remaining 33%, likely because different segments or code
lines within the same function were written by different authors, a common practice in
writing complex software.
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5.5.2 Applying BinAuthor to Stuxnet and Flame
Findings. BinAuthor found the following coding habits automatically: the use of global
variables, Lua scripting language, a speciﬁc open-source package SQLite, and heap sort
rather than other sorting methods (general choices); the choice of opening and terminating
processes (qualitative choices); the presence of recursion patterns and the use of POSIX
socket API rather than BSD socket API (structural choices); and the use of functions that
are close in terms of the Mahalanobis distance, with distance close to 0.1; and the passing
of primitive types by value, but the passing of objects by reference (embedded choices).
Statistics. As shown in Table 5.8, BinAuthor identiﬁed functions common to Stuxnet
and Flame that share the aforementioned coding habits.
Summary. BinAuthor clustered the functions and found that 13% ((180 + 294) / (1434
+ 2154)) were written by one author, while 34% ((515 + 689) / (1434 + 2154)) were
written by multiple authors. No common choices were found in the remaining 53% of the
functions. The fact that these malware packages follow the same rules and set the same
targets suggests that Stuxnet and Flame are written by an organization.
5.5.3 Applying BinAuthor to Zeus and Citadel
Findings. BinAuthor identiﬁed the following coding habits: the use of network resources
rather than ﬁle resources, creating conﬁgurations using mostly conﬁg ﬁles, the use of
speciﬁc packages such as webph and ultraVNC (general choices); the use of switch
statements rather than if statements (structural choices); the use of semaphores and locks
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(qualitative choices); and the presence of functions that are close in terms of the Maha-
lanobis distance, with distance = 0.0004 (embedded choices).
Statistics. As listed in Table 5.8, BinAuthor found functions common to Zeus and
Citadel that share the aforementioned coding habits.
Summary. After BinAuthor clustered the functions, it appears that 33% were written by a
single author, while 53% were written by the same team of multiple authors. No common
choices were found for the remaining 14% of the functions. Our ﬁndings clearly support
the common belief that Zeus and Citadel were written by the same team of authors.
5.5.4 Verifying correctness of BinAuthor Findings
Due to the lack of ground truth, we verify the correctness of BinAuthor ﬁndings using
following methods: Comparing BinAuthor outputs to the ﬁndings of human experts in
available technical reports [10, 85, 91]; measuring the distance between the choices in
one cluster and the choices in another to calculate the degree of similarity; measuring
the degree of similarity between the extracted choices from the two malware packages in
one pair and those from the second dataset (for which we have the ground truth since the
source code is available) to provide a clear indication of whether the choices are closely
related to speciﬁc malware packages.
Comparison with technical reports. We compare the BinAuthor ﬁndings with those
made by human experts in technical reports. For Bunny and Babar, our results match
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the technical report published by the Citizen Lab [91], which demonstrates that both mal-
ware packages were written by a set of authors according to common implementation
traits (general and qualitative choices) and infrastructure usage (general choices). The
correspondence between the BinAuthor ﬁndings and those in the technical report is the
following: 60% of the choices matched those mentioned in the report, and 40% did not;
10% of the choices found in the technical report were not ﬂagged by BinAuthor as they
require dynamic extraction of features, while BinAuthor uses a static process.
For Stuxnet and Flame, our results corroborate the technical report published
by Kaspersky [85], which shows that both malware packages use similar infrastructure
(e.g., Lua) and are associated with an organization. In addition, the BinAuthor ﬁndings
suggest that both malware packages originated from the same organization. The frequent
use of particular qualitative choices, such as the way the code is secured, indicates the use
of certain programming standards and strict adherence to the same rules. Moreover, the
BinAuthor ﬁndings provide much more information concerning the authorship of these
malware packages. The correspondence between the BinAuthor ﬁndings and those in
the technical report is as follows: all the choices found in the report [85] were found
by BinAuthor, but they represent only 10% of our ﬁndings. The remaining 90% of the
BinAuthor ﬁndings were not ﬂagged by the report.
For Zeus and Citadel, our results match the ﬁndings of the technical report
published by McAfee [10], indicating that Zeus and Citadel were written by the same
team of authors. The correspondence between the ﬁndings of BinAuthor and those of
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McAfee are as follows: 45% of the choices matched those in the report, while 55% did
not, and 8% of the technical report ﬁndings were not ﬂagged by BinAuthor.
Measuring similarity between choices in malware binaries. In this section, the goal is
to assess the similarity between malware binaries by reporting the statistics about common
choices (Table 5.9). We observed that there are only ten choices common to Bunny and
Stuxnet, which clearly indicates that the malware packages were written by different
authors. These choices are found in seven functions, which amounts to ( 7/(854 + 2154))=
0.2% shared author habits. In comparison, there are seventeen choices common to Flame
and Zeus, found in thirty-eight functions, so the percentage of shared author habits is (38
/ (1434 +557)) = 2%. The results in Table 5.9 may provide clues about the validity of the
BinAuthor ﬁndings.
Table 5.9: Choices found in malware binaries
Bunny Babar Stuxnet Flame Zeus Citadel
Bunny - 500 10 2 4 12
Babar 500 - 4 9 0 5
Stuxnet 10 4 - 750 14 3
Flame 2 9 750 - 17 6
Zeus 4 0 14 17 - 670
Citadel 12 5 3 6 670 -
Measuring the degree of similarity between ground truth datasets and malware bi-
naries.
As another veriﬁcation of the correctness of the ﬁndings, we measured the degree of
similarity between the dataset used here and other datasets for which we have the ground
truth (e.g., Google code jam) to see how likely such a degree of similarity could come
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from shared authorship. The goal of computing the degree of similarity is to determine
whether the habits found in the malware binaries are present to the same degree in con-
ventional binaries, which will reveal whether these habits are indeed speciﬁc to malware
writers. To provide an even more convincing veriﬁcation, we computed the similarity
scores between related pairs of malware and the rest of the available dataset. The results
are presented in Table 5.10. BinAuthor found a total of 500 choices in Bunny & Babar,
of which 45 choices, i.e., only 1%, are similar to those in the Student project dataset.
We believe that one of the main reasons for the low similarity is that the programmers
participating in the Google code jam may have greater expertise, more extensive back-
ground knowledge, and better skills than the typical malware writer. Another comparison
revealed that 104/500 = 21% of the choices are common to GitHub authors and malware
writers. At the same time, the choices in Stuxnet & Flame have less similarity with
the other datasets: 2%, 1%, 0.2%, and 4% for Google code jam, planet code, student code,
and GitHub code, respectively.
Table 5.10: Number of choices common to the malware dataset and the ground truth
dataset
Google Planet Student GitHub
Bunny & Babar 6% 6% 1% 10%
Stuxnet & Flame 1% 4% 0% 7%
Zeus & Citadel 7% 9% 3% 17%
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5.6 Summary
To conclude, we have presented the ﬁrst known effort on decoupling coding habits from
functionality. Previous research has applied machine learning techniques to extract sty-
lometry styles and can distinguish between 5-50 authors, whereas we can handle up to
1500 authors. In addition, existing works have only employed artiﬁcial datasets, whereas
we included more realistic datasets. In summary, our system demonstrates superior results
on more realistic datasets.
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Chapter 6
Towards Extracting Semantics of
Binary Code
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we propose a novel technique that extracts the semantics of binary code
in terms of both data and control ﬂow. Our technique allows more robust binary analysis
because the extracted semantics of the binary code is generally immune from code trans-
formation techniques and varying the compilers or compilation settings. Speciﬁcally, we
apply data-ﬂow analysis to extract the semantic ﬂow of the registers as well as the se-
mantic components of the control ﬂow graph, which are then synthesized into a novel
representation called the semantic ﬂow graph (SFG). Subsequently, various properties,
such as reﬂexive, symmetric, antisymmetric, and transitive relations, are extracted from
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the SFG and applied to binary analysis. We implement our system in a tool called Bin-
Gold and evaluate it against thirty binary code applications. Our evaluation shows that
BinGold successfully determines the similarity between binaries, yielding results that are
highly robust against code transformation techniques. In addition, we demonstrate the ap-
plication of BinGold to two important binary analysis tasks: binary code authorship attri-
bution, and the detection of reused functions across program executables. The promising
results suggest that BinGold can be used to enhance existing techniques, making them
more robust and practical.
6.2 Motivating Example
We start with a simple example composed of part of MD5 written in C++ (Listing 1).
In this sample, the hex representation of the digest is returned as a string. MD5 per-
forms many binary operations on the “message” (text or binary data) to compute a 128-bit
“hash”. We compile this part of the MD5 example code on Windows 7 using g++, Visual
Studio 2010, Clang, and ICC. We then use IDA to disassemble the binary. Many security
tools use IDA in this way, as a ﬁrst step before performing additional analysis [71, 104].
Listing 6.1: Motivating example: Part of MD5 method










We compute the control ﬂow graph for the fragment and then compare them as
illustrated in Table 6.1. We notice through the motivating example that the compiler also
makes changes to both the control structure and the basic blocks and hence instructions.
We show a list of traditional features in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1: Graph features applied on CFGs for the fragment code in Listing 1, which is
compiled by visual studio, ICC, g++, and Clang
Feature Graph A Graph B Graph C Graph D
# of nodes 8 8 13 5
# of edges 9 8 15 4
K-cone 0-4 0-6 0-4 0-3
Radius 2 3 5 2
Width of graph 3 2 4 2
Length of graph 5 7 5 4
Diameter 3 4 6 2
Cyclometry Complexity 3 2 4 1
We name the graphs as graph A, graph B, graph C, and Graph D; these graphs
represent CFGs from visual studio, ICC, g++, and Clang, respectively. We can see in
Table 6.1 that among some graphs, there are features with the same values; for example
the number of nodes is the same for graphs A and B. Cyclomatic complexity varies; it is
calculated by M = E - N + 2P, where E is the number of edges, N is the number of nodes,
125
and P is the number of connected components. Additionally, we observe there are some
common values between graphs A and C. For instance, the number of nodes is 8 when it
is compiled with Visual Studio, but it is 13 with g++ and 5 with Clang. Additionally, the
number of edges ranges from 4 to 17.
Table 6.2: Graph features description
Feature Description
Number of nodes Number of basic blocks
Number of edges Number of control ﬂows (i.e., true)
K-cone K represents the number of CFG level
Radius Minimum vertex eccentricity
Width of graph Maximum number of nodes at the same level
Length of graph Number of nodes in the longest path
Diameter The longest shortest path between any two nodes in the graph
Cyclometry Complexity Number of linearly independent paths within the CFG
As a result of the aforementioned differences, the structural approaches may lead
to false positives by claiming that two graphs are the same (because of similar graph
features), when in fact they are not. Additionally, we observe through the motivating
example that there are differences in instructions at the syntax level; these differences
affect the results of the syntax approaches in terms of reporting similarities. Hence, the
necessity of having an automated tool that can simply extract the semantics of a code will
signiﬁcantly reduce the percentage of false positives.
6.3 Extracting Semantics of Binary Code
In this section, we describe how we built upon the background in Section 2 to perform the
task of extracting the semantics of a binary code.
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004020D0   push    ebp
004020D1   mov     ebp, esp
004020D3   sub     esp, 30h
004020D6   mov     eax, ___security_cookie
004020DB   xor     eax, ebp
004020DD   mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
004020E0    push    esi
004020E1    push    edi
004020E2    xor     edi, edi
004020E4    cmp     byte ptr [this], 0
004020E7    mov     esi, ecx
004020E9    mov     [ebp+var_2C], esi
004020EC   mov     [ebp+var_30], edi















004020D0   stack      reg1
004020D1   generic   reg1,reg2
004020D3   Math       reg1, C
004020D6   generic   reg2,fun
004020DB   log          reg2, reg1
004020DD   generic   [reg1+var1], reg3
004020E0    stack      reg4
004020E1    stack      reg5
004020E2    log          reg5, reg5
004020E4    cmp        reg4, C
004020E7    generic   reg4, reg2
004020E9    generic   [reg1+var2], reg4
004020EC   generic   [reg1+var3], reg5
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Figure 6.1: Architecture overview
6.3.1 Architecture Overview
Our architecture employs a series of techniques illustrated in Figure 6.1 and described in
the upcoming sections. First, the binary code is disassembled by IDA Pro [8] disassem-
bler. Second, a set of rules are applied to assembly instructions to normalize the code.
Third, data ﬂow rules are applied to these normalized instructions to construct data ﬂow
dependencies. In addition, we extract the semantics of the CFG by constructing a conser-
vative approximation of the target function prototype by means of a use-def analysis of
possible callees. We then couple these results with liveness analysis at each indirect call
site to arrive at a many-to-many relationship between call sites and target callees in order
to recover call site and callee signatures. Both types of semantics are integrated into a
new representation called the SFG. Subsequently, the properties of the SFG, such as the
reﬂexive, symmetric, and transitive relations are extracted from the SFG.
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6.3.2 Data Flow Graph Construction
After normalizing the instructions, we apply data ﬂow to infer the program variable rela-
tions using coarse reasoning about the program control ﬂow and data dependencies. De-
pending on how such analyses choose to model the ﬂow of information through the data
structures. Let Rk/Wk denote registers or memory that instruction Ik reads or writes. If
i1 and i2 are instructions belonging to I and they are in the same basic block, then we
deﬁne the following possible dependencies: i1 writes something which will be read by
i2; i1 reads something before i2 overwrites it; and i1 and i2 both write the same variable.
This category of dependency is considered an internal dependency. The other dependency
is control dependence. If i1 and i2 are both in the same basic block, and i2 is a control
instruction, we call it an internal control dependence. Also, i1 and i2 are in two different
basic blocks, where i1 is the last instruction in the ﬁrst basic block and i2 is executed in
the second basic block as the ﬁrst instruction, where the second basic block is a succes-
sor of the ﬁrst basic block in the control ﬂow graph, then it is also an internal control
dependence.
6.3.3 Equivalence Relations and Partitions in SFG
The data ﬂow graph together with the invariants form the semantic ﬂow graph. We com-
bine this semantic information to form a new representation in order to facilitate more
efﬁcient graph matching between different binary codes for determining the similarity or
integrating into some existing frameworks. Formally, a semantic ﬂow graph (SFG) is
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deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. A semantic ﬂow graph G = (N ,V , ζ , γ, ϑ, λ, ω) is a directed attributed
graph where N is a set of nodes, V ⊆ (N × N ) is a set of edges and ζ is edge labeling
function which assigns a label to each edge: ζ −→ γ, where γ is a set of labels (internal
dependency or external dependency). ϑ is a call-callee relation function which colors
each node n  N based on its relation with other node k  N . Finally, ω is a function for
coloring dataﬂow control or data dependencies.
We illustrate a simple example in Figure 6.2 to show how SFG could be constructed.
As shown, ω is a function for coloring dataﬂow dependencies; control or data dependency.
ϑ is a call-callee relation function. We can notice the green color in Figure 6.2 (c) repre-
sents caller-callee relation. For instance, i2 has a caller-callee relation with i5. Besides,
We then construct the relations from the SFG. We generalize equivalence relations
and equivalence classes, where an equivalence relation on a set of features (semantics
features) F is a relation R ⊂ F x F such that:
• (fi, fj) ε R for all fεF , which is called the reﬂexive property
• (fi, fj) ε R implies (fj, fi) ε R
• (fi, fj) and (fj, fk) ε R imply (fi, fk)
We also extract a collection of nonempty sets of features F, which is called partition
P. This is a collection of nonempty sets f1, f2, ... such that fi
⋂
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Figure 6.2: Example of constructing SFG
⋃
k Fk = X . Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on a set F and let fεF . Then [f ] = {fjεF :
fj ∼ fi is called the equivalence class of f}.
6.4 Detection Process
We next describe the detection system Bingold. Since Bingold extracts different types of
features that capture the semantics of code, the detection system is composed of multiple





















Figure 6.3: Detection system
6.4.1 Exact Matching
As previously described, we normalize the code according to predeﬁned rules and then
apply the predeﬁned categories to those normalized instructions. We then convert those
instructions to hash vectors. Finally, we match instructions together.
6.4.2 Graph Edit Distance
For inexact matching between data ﬂow graphs, a distance metric is needed. We employ
Algorithm 1 introduced in 3.3.4. Given two data ﬂow graphs, to transform one graph into
another, we deﬁne two concepts: internal flow dependency and external
flow dependency. The edit distance between two data ﬂow graphs G and H is thus
deﬁned as the minimum weight of all dependencies d between them; i.e., sim(G,H) =
min w(VG,H), where V is the function for checking the dependencies. We also use the
same dissimilarity introduced in 3.3.4 between two data ﬂow graphs G and H .
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6.4.3 Similarity Measure
For the extracted relations, we compare two graphs in terms of the similarity of their
reﬂexive, symmetric, and transitive relations. Given two data SFGs G and H , we deﬁne
the similarity measure sim(G,H) = max R(VG,H). R is a function extracts the common
relations between two graphs and measures the similarity between them.
6.4.4 Weight Parameter Settings
We deﬁne for each component (data ﬂow, caller-callee relationship, and SFG) in our
system a weight. These weights are: α, β, and γ, to determine the contribution of each
component. We experimentally determine the optimal values for these parameters. The
parameter setting is computed using nine-fold cross-validation. We evaluate values of α
ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of size 0.1 and β ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of size 0.1.
For a given choice of α, β, and γ, it is required that α + β + γ = 1. In each setting, the
features are extracted using our system and the F1 score is computed that the maximum
F1 score is obtained for α = 0.5, β = 0.2, and γ = 0.3. We use these values as the default
for BinGold as well as throughout the rest of the evaluation.
6.5 Evaluation
This section details the evaluation of our system. Section 6.5.1 describes the dataset used
in our evaluation. Section 6.5.2 presents the evaluation metrics. Section 6.5.3 shows
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the results of our system for different compilers and compilation settings. Section 6.5.4
shows the robustness of our system against code transformation techniques. Finally, sec-
tion 6.5.6 shows the effect of integrating our system into certain existing approaches and
demonstrates improvements in accuracy.
6.5.1 Dataset
We evaluate our system against 30 programs for which we have the source code. These
programs are only used to extract the ground truth by compiling the source code with
debugging information.
Table 6.3 summarizes the 30 programs. For each program, the table shows the
program identiﬁer, the program name, the binary code statistics, and the source compiler.
From the binary code it captures the type of executable generated (PE or ELF) and the
number of functions in the executable. The binary code information is extracted using
IDA pro [8] by reading the executable’s debugging information. 3 projects compiled by 4
compilers, 8 projects compiled by 3 compilers, and 19 projects compiled by 2 compilers.
The dependency of the program restricts us to compiling each project using 4 compilers.
Our dataset are open-source projects from SourceForge [24], and the GNU software
repository [18]. Our dataset includes 17 PE binaries and 13 ELF binaries. We include
multiple programs from the same project that could be compiled by different compilers
and use those programs to analyze the applicability and efﬁciency of our system.
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Table 6.3: Programs used in our system evaluation
Binary Code
ID Program Type Function Compiler
1 SQlite PE 3920 VS, GCC, ICC, Clang
2 OpenSSL PE 2163 VS, GCC
3 info-zip PE 1784 VS, ICC
4 jabber PE 5910 VS, GCC
5 Hashdeep PE 2905 VS, Clang, GCC
6 libpng PE 9226 VS, GCC
7 ultraVNC PE 3526 VS, GCC
8 lcms PE 1082 Clang, ICC, GCC
9 ibavcodec PE 739 VS, GCC, ICC
10 TrueCrypt PE 1093 VS, GCC
11 libjsoncpp PE 4114 VS, ICC
12 7z PE 2179 VS, GCC, ICC
13 7zG PE 2530 VS, GCC, ICC
14 7zFM PE 3149 VS, GCC, ICC
15 lzip ELF 33 VS, GCC
16 tinyXMLTest ELF 2744 VS, GCC, ICC, Clang
17 libxml2 ELF 58 VS, GCC, ICC
18 Mersenne Twister ELF 2740 VS, GCC
19 bzip2 ELF 285 VS, GCC
20 lshw ELF 1429 VS, GCC
21 smartctl ELF 457 VS, GCC
22 pdftohtml ELF 499 VS, GCC, Clang
23 ELF statiﬁer ELF 2340 VS, GCC
24 FileZilla PE 6250 VS, GCC
25 ncat PE 1855 VS, GCC
26 Hasher PE 436 VS, GCC, ICC, Clang
27 tfshark ELF 439 VS, GCC
28 dumpcap ELF 448 VS, GCC
29 tshark ELF 1008 VS, GCC
30 pageant ELF 2212 VS, GCC
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6.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the accuracy of our system, we conducted the following experiments. First,
we compared two sets of results: the results output by some existing tools (i.e., author-
ship attribution, clone detection) and the results after integrating our system with these
tools. Second, we compared the similarity of the same program when it is compiled by
different compilers and with different compilation settings. Third, we applied different
code transformation techniques to the same binary ﬁle and checked the similarity based
on the semantic information extracted by our system. Finally, we applied different refac-
toring techniques to the source code and compiled it using different compilers. We then
employed our tool to measure the similarity between the binary ﬁles.
We use validity metrics such as precision, recall, and F1. Precision (P) and recall








where TP (true positives) is the number of functions assigned correctly by our system; FP
(false positives) is the number of functions assigned incorrectly by our system; and FN
(false negatives) is the number of functions not assigned by our system but which actually
belong to it. To combine both precision and recall, we use the Fδ score with δ = 1, which
is equal to the harmonic mean of the precision and recall values. F1 scores fall within the
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interval [0, 1], where the larger the F1 score, the better the overall accuracy.
6.5.3 Accuracy Results of C/C++ Programs with Different Compilers
and Compilation Settings
As previously mentioned, we compiled 30 programs using different compilers such as
Clang and ICC. We evaluate how well our system detects the similarities among those
executables using the F1 score. Table 6.4 summarizes the results. The median F1 score is
0.78. The precision ranges from 0.60 to 0.90, and the recall ranges from 0.64 to 0.92.
The accuracy of the C++ results is higher than the accuracy of the C results because
C++ source code contains classes with small-sized methods. These small components are
mostly unaffected by compilers or compilation settings. However, they may be inlined
and are thus easily identiﬁed based on data ﬂow components. For instance, the program
FileZilla has the highest F1 score of 0.90, while the program dumpcap has the lowest F1
score of 0.63. For C programs, the median F1 score is 0.67. The results for C binary code
similarity are worse than the results for C++ programs. This is expected as C program-
mers are not constrained by the object-oriented paradigm and often place functions with
different semantics in the same source ﬁle. For example, the ﬁle tfshark.c in tfshark com-
bines string processing, message processing (read/write/print), and common functions for
program output. These functions are technically similar in semantic representation, but
the presence of all three reduces the F1 score to 0.64 when using automated ground truth
based on source ﬁles. Moreover, C programs have less modularity than C++ programs so
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it may be harder to extract the semantics of a code.
Table 6.4: Our system accuracy in determining the similarity between binaries
Program Precision Recall F1 Program Precision Recall F1
SQlite 0.75 0.88 0.81 tinyXMLTest 072 0.79 0.75
OpenSSL 0.72 0.66 0.69 libxml2 0.78 0.82 0.80
info-zip 0.68 0.9 0.77 Mersenne Twister 0.78 0.88 0.83
jabber 0.67 0.88 0.76 bzip2 0.82 0.9 0.86
Hashdeep 0.63 0.72 0.67 lshw 0.83 0.83 0.83
libpng 0.82 0.68 0.74 smartctl 0.89 0.92 0.90
ultraVNC 0.81 0.67 0.73 pdftohtml 0.85 0.75 0.80
lcms 0.75 0.66 0.70 ELF statiﬁer 0.83 0.74 0.78
ibavcodec 0.77 0.81 0.79 FileZilla 0.90 0.92 0.90
TrueCrypt 0.90 0.88 0.89 ncat 0.72 0.71 0.71
libjsoncpp 0.85 0.67 0.75 Hasher 0.71 0.68 0.69
7z 0.74 0.77 0.73 tfshark 0.70 0.65 0.67
7zG 0.66 0.81 0.73 dumpcap 0.62 0.64 0.63
7zFM 0.66 0.82 0.76 tshark 0.60 0.68 0.64
lzip 0.66 0.9 0.75 pageant 0.67 0.67 0.67
6.5.4 Accuracy Results after Applying Code Transformation Tech-
niques
We consider a random set of 15 ﬁles from our dataset and compile them using Visual
Studio 2010. The binaries are converted into assembly ﬁles through the disassembler, and
the code is then obfuscated using the DaLin generator [87]. This generator applies the
following: (i) register renaming (RR), which is one of the oldest and simplest techniques
used in metamorphic generators; (ii) Instruction reordering (IR), which transposes instruc-
tions that do not depend on the output of previous instructions; (iii) Dead code insertion
(DCI), which injects a piece of code that has no effect on program execution (i.e., may not
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execute or may execute with no effect); and (iv) equivalent instruction replacement (EIR).
We perform initial tests on the selected ﬁles and report the accuracy measurements. code
transformation techniques are then applied and new accuracy is obtained and observed.
We used existing open-source tools for the C++ refactoring process [1, 16]. We
consider the introduced techniques in 2.3. The results are shown in Table 6.5. The results
shown in the table demonstrate that our system performs well in identifying similarities.
6.5.5 Time Efﬁciency
The running time for extracting the semantics of code is measured by considering the
total time spent during each step: normalization process, extracting the semantics of the
data ﬂow, extracting the semantics of the control ﬂow, and forming the SFG by extracting
the binary relations. In the semantic extraction process, the binary application is ﬁrst dis-
assembled using IDA pro [8], and features are then extracted by running our IDApython
script. The assembly instructions must ﬁrst be normalized and hashed to a unique value.
This process of extracting the features takes 15 seconds for the smallest application in
our dataset (which is dumpcap) and 45 seconds for the largest application (libpng) on
a Windows 32-bit machine with 16GB RAM. Extracting the ﬁrst part of the semantics
(data ﬂow) takes 20 seconds for dumpcap and 60 seconds for libpng, while extracting
the second part of the semantics (control ﬂow) takes 23 seconds for dumpcap and 26
seconds for libpng. The last step, forming the new representation and extracting the rela-
tions described in Section 4.5, takes 10 seconds for dumpcap and 14 seconds for libpng.
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Based on those results, we believe our system will be efﬁcient enough for most real world
applications.
Table 6.5: Results after applying code transformation techniques
Method Precision Recall F1
RR 0.89 0.88 0.88
IR 0.91 0.92 0.91
DCI 0.87 0.93 0.90
EIR 0.81 0.82 0.81
RV 0.87 0.90 0.88
MM 0.85 0.82 0.83
NM 0.67 0.72 0.70
6.5.6 Applications
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our system to two applications: author-
ship attribution and clone detection. Previous work has demonstrated that it is possible
to identify the authors of binary code [27, 112]. However, existing approaches usually
assume that the compiler and its settings are known. In addition, the features used in
such techniques are sensitive to any code transformation techniques. Hence, we apply
our system to the binary and then re-examine their features based on the outputs of our
system. Regarding clone detection, some existing works have demonstrated the use of
K-CFG [81], Tracelet, n-grams [81, 112], idioms [81, 112], RFG [27], and strings [81].
Both authorship and clone accuracy are greatly improved by integrating our tool with the
aforementioned tools, as shown in Table 6.6.
Dataset. The dataset we use for authorship attribution originates from Google Code Jam
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2010 [5]. It consists of single-authored programs. For each author, there are multiple
programs as the Code Jam is a multi-round programming contest. The dataset therefore
provides a perfect benchmark for authorship attribution, and data from Google Code Jam
has been used in all recent program authorship studies (e.g., [27], [112]). Regarding clone
detection, we use 10 programs from our dataset (1-10).
Evaluation. Because the application domain is much more sensitive to false positives
than false negatives, we use the F-measure as introduced in 5.4.5. Because each com-
ponent in our system can handle one or more effects, our system could enhance the ap-
plication of existing works. For instance, the normalization can handle compiler effects,
data ﬂow analysis can identify inline functions, the caller-callee relationship can tackle
the refactoring process, and the relation extracted from the SFG can handle most code
transformation techniques. Results are summarized in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Effect of integrating BinGold to certain existing works
Feature F0.5 F0.5 Application
(Before applying BinGold) (After applying BinGold)
Idioms [112] 0.71 0.80 Authorship
Idioms [81] 0.72 0.88 Clone
Graphlet [112] 0.60 0.76 Authorship
RFG [27] 0.72 0.79 Authorship
Call graphlet
[112] 0.64 0.71 Authorship
K-CFG [81] 0.78 0.877 Clone
Tracelet [53] 0.66 0.70 Function Fingerprint-ing
According to the results in Table 6.6, we can conclude that our tool leads to substan-
tial improvements in the accuracy of existing work. For instance, it improves the accuracy
of clone systems (e.g., idioms) by 16%, which is a considerable improvement. Another
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example considers the Tracelet system, since it already includes normalization techniques
and data ﬂow analysis, our tools only provide the beneﬁt of semantics in terms of control
ﬂow graph, which leads to 4% improvement of accuracy.
6.6 Summary
To conclude, we have designed a system called BinGold for accurately and automatically
recovering the semantics of a binary code. Our experimental results indicate that the
approach is efﬁcient in terms of computational resources and could thus be considered
a practical approach to real-world binary analysis. Moreover, the experimental results





This chapter concludes the ﬁndings of this thesis and highlights the future directions.
7.1 Concluding Remarks
The rise of malware attacks reported by companies and anti-virus vendors has pushed se-
curity researchers to propose new methodologies to extract intelligence about the authors
of these attacks in order to provide countermeasures. In this context, this thesis aims to
provide automated solutions for understanding the behavior of such malware binaries. We
have elaborated on four threads of research, which may help provide interesting insights
about malware binary code. We have shown how static and dynamic analyses of malware
binary code help the security community to identify binary provenance, reused functions,
third-party libraries such as free open source packages, and binary authorship attribution.
142
We began our research reviewing the existing binary code ﬁngerprinting frame-
works. Hence, we systematized the area of binary code ﬁngerprints according to its most
important dimensions: the applications that motivate its importance, the approaches used,
and the aspects of the framework ﬁngerprints. The details of this study was provided in
Chapter 2. This step is important since it allowed us to investigate the different aspects of
binary code to gain expertise in malware binary analysis and to deﬁne new perspectives
related to malware research. Despite the importance of reverse-engineering prominent
malware binary code analysis, this process turns to be tedious due to the huge number of
observed malware collected in the wild. It also investigated the existing efforts that are
related to binary program provenance, reused function detection, ﬁngerprinting free open
software packages, and binary authorship attribution.
In Chapter 3, we proposed a novel approach called SIGMA for effectively identi-
fying reused functions in binary code. Instead of relying on one source of information,
our approach combines multiple representations into one joint data structure SIG. SIGMA
also supports inexact matching and exact matching based on traces of the SIG which deals
with function fragments. Our experimental results demonstrated the effectiveness of our
method.
In Chapter 4, we introduced FOSSIL, a system for identifying FOSS functions. It
facilitates the tedious and error-prone task of manual malware reverse engineering and
enables the use of suitable security tools on binary code. Determining FOSS functions
in malware binaries has received limited attention compared to other ﬁelds such as clone
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detection. Our evaluation demonstrated that FOSSIL yields highly accurate results.
In Chapter 5, we proposed BinAuthor, a system capable of decoupling program
functionality from authors’ coding habits in binary code. It leveraged a set of features
that are based on collections of functionality-independent choices made by authors during
coding. Our evaluation showed that BinAuthor outperforms existing methods in several
aspects. First, decoupling authorship from functionality allows us to apply BinAuthor to
real malware binaries to automatically generate evidence on similar coding habits, which
matches existing ﬁndings by security experts and reverse engineers. Second, it success-
fully attributes a larger number of authors with signiﬁcantly higher accuracy when com-
pared to existing research contributions. Third, BinAuthor is more robust than previous
methods in the sense that there is no signiﬁcant drop in accuracy when the code is sub-
jected to refactoring techniques, source and binary obfuscation, and different compilers.
In Chapter 6, we proposed a novel technique that extracts the semantics of binary
code in terms of both data and control ﬂow. Our technique allowed more robust binary
analysis because the extracted semantics of the binary code are generally immune from
code transformation, refactoring, and variations of the compilers or compilation settings.
We applied data-ﬂow analysis to extract the semantic ﬂow of the registers as well as the
semantic components of the control ﬂow graph, which are then synthesized into a novel
representation called the semantic ﬂow graph (SFG). Our experimental results demon-




Our future work aims to include the following directions.
Advanced Obfuscation: This thesis is based on a main assumption that the binary code
under analysis is unpacked and de-obfuscated. While this assumption may be reasonable
for many general-purpose software, it implies the need for a pre-processing step involving
unpacking/de-obfuscation before applying the method to malware. Second, our tool fails
to handle most of the advanced obfuscation techniques such as Virtualization and jitting.
We have plan to extend this thesis to include a set of dynamic features.
Privacy Concerns: Our tool, BinAuthor, could be misused to violate privacy of the
coders. Therefore, we have to consider the privacy implications of BinAuthor in the future
work.
Multiple Architecture: This thesis deals with only one architecture (x86). We chose this
architecture because the most common CPU architectures nowadays are x86 for personal
computers and server systems. However, in the world of mobile computing, the ARM
architecture is the most common. The MIPS is also important in most control systems.
We will study how to systematically address the problem of dealing with multiple archi-
tectures in future work.
Dataset Size: Although our current repository already has a decent size, it would need
to be further enriched with a massive number of ﬁles. However, one of the biggest chal-
lenges we face involves how to automate gathering, compiling, and indexing FOSS pack-
ages. Each FOSS may have its unique dependencies, which makes automating the process
145
difﬁcult. Our future research will include extending this system as a search engine for bi-
nary queries, and to also test it under a larger number of FOSS packages. Thus, a small
fragment of assembly code or an executable could be queried to obtain useful information
related to their functionality.
Efﬁciency: Through our experimental results, we notice that our tools, SIGMA and Bin-
Gold, the efﬁciency is an issue. Consequently, we have a plan in the future to employ
the MapReduce paradigm [56] with a distributed version of the algorithm in order to dis-
tribute the computation over a cluster of servers.
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